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Major features o,f economic and. social : 
• " developments 1950-1975 . ' 
It'appears from the assessment.:.of,.post-war::Latin American 
economic and social' development that.the overall view which prevailed 
in the early 1950s on'the relationships, between économie dyiiamism 
and social change has been confpunded by events in an unexpected 
way. Economic growth achieved rates, which were then considered to 
be highly ambitious, and this was intimately linked with' social 
transformations, but the latter diverged widely" from the higher 
level of consensus and the more egalitarian social order which the 
development ideologies of the . time,..held . to. be the natural concomitants 
of such dynamic growth. 
In the early 1950s a development ideology had taken shape 
which corresponded to the situation, at the time. It advanced a 
vision 'of continuous 'progress, combined..with;, social' and-economic 
reforms which would bring about a higher degree of social consensus. 
This vision responded to the aspiratiqn- of ̂governments and dominant 
social groups' to create national societies, Timt»une from recurrence 
of recent traumatic experiences which.had disrupted their economic 
and social structures. At the same time, the success of the 
industrializatioh policy already followed by many countries fostered 
the vision of a replica of North American and European models. The 
1950s boom' in the central economies, the effects of the Marshall 
Plan and North American leadership in the cold war period all 
confirmed the link between growth and welfare. 
Economic dynamism 
Economic dynamism picked up over the last ten years and the 
regiqn significantly altered the structure of its supply, 
diversifying production and creating a regional'market whose 
dimensions were qualitatively and quantitatively different from 
those of the post-war market. Since the transformation of the 
region' involved discontinuous changes,: different stages may be 
/distinguished. Again, 
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distinguished. Again, economic growth did not follow uniform 
patterns in all countries and subregions> On the contrary, a 
comparison of the situation pf.the.region at the beginning of the 
period with the situation at the end. shows a change in rthe.relative 
position and potential of the countries. (See table Int. 1.) -. 
Both external, and internal; .factors; are at play in determining 
the different stages. The external situation was very .similar for 
most of the countries,, and its effect on development depended 
primarily on- domestic .factors.. From the standpoint of the 
international setting, two stage.s may? be clearly-distinguished. The 
first runs from the early 1950s up to,, the .middle : of . the 1960s. It 
is characterized by rather sluggish . external markets:̂ , except in a 
few years during the Korean V/ar, with a slow-growth in the, volume 
of Latin American exports, a downward trend in the terms; of trade 
and a limited supply of .external financing. In ;!th<?: second stage, 
from the middle of .the 1960s to 1973, external demand is buoyant 
and there are. large f\oy!p of-external financing.. :: 
In the first stage, the. ..court.tries had to make a..considerable 
internal effort, whilp in the, second they were faced..with the challenge 
of a new, dynamic external setting., , The.ir performance 1 in the first 
stage depended primarily on their varying capacity to parry out 
import substitution..Although they were , not all in the ;same 
position to undertake this stage of industrialization, the first 
measures consisted in the, installation of industry of a technical 
scale which was feasible for at .least the large and medium sized 
countries. Furthermore,, the problem was essentially one of supply, 
since the demand was already established. In contrast, the second 
stage called for a number of conditions present in fewer countries, 
in order to tap .external financing, carry out further changes in 
the productive structure and diversify exports. 
Foreign capital mainly went.to develop new industries in those 
countries which possessed an acceptable political situation and a 
sufficiently large domestic market,, and to. a lesser extent to the 
exploitation of various natural resources, except in the case of oil 
/in Venezuela. 
in Venezuela. In the circumstances», the countries most favoured by-
foreign capital were those with large martcet's and some small ... 
countries which began to exploit resources: With- gòod international 
prices whose marginal effect on..th.e; economy Was; considerable. . Among 
the latter, particular benefit was derived by thè countries which 
undertook the first stages of,.,industrialization,; taking advantage . 
of the balance-of-payments situation, created by- thè inflow of 
financing and the diversification pf exports. 
On the other side there were, the medium and'striali countries 
which had already carried out the first stage' of import substitution 
or did not possess Sufficient natural ,resources to increase ,. 
substantially the volume of priced,experts' enjoying good prices. 
These countries faced' a twin problem*'.-they lacked a sufficiently . 
large internal market to proceed with industrialization and attract,-
external financing, and they were unable to satisfy more sophisticated 
internal, demand by means of foreign trade. Subregional integration 
schemes thus appeared to be a suitable solution for a large group of., 
countries. While significant, progress- hasnbé'è'if"made in this field, 
the potential of economic integration..-is, stillpfar froin fully 
exploited and it may therefore be said^t^at. ¡thè ' ex^ei-iment is still 
at an early stage.' "" . •.., ,:'; ; ., 
The growth'oi:production wa§ linked-with'the emergence of a 
pattern of .consumption whose modes and styles resembled those of4 
the developed countries. This was in turn closely linked to foreign 
investment which vèry often came to exploit the domestic'markets of 
the countries with greater economic and demographic weight. The size 
of the market was decisive, since the ...technologies emanating from the 
central ̂ countries presupposed production on .a large scale..Furthermore 
this type of industrial development requires an infrastructure of, ....... 
transport, power arid basic inputs only justified by large markets.. 
Technology, production scales and large-scale financing 
brought about a change of the utmost importance in the model of growth 
over the last ten years. Private enterprise lost ground to the public 
sector and to foreign capital in the shape of transnational 
1 /corporations. This 
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corporations» This trend of concentration:of ownership in thé hands 
of a small number of public and p^iv^e y companies entailed changes 
in the social and political realm,.,and ;le& ..further and. further away 
from the model of lower concentration advocated' by 'the post-war 
development ideology. ... ,¡, ... ; ; : " 
On the whole, in the period 19.50ri?,75'i.endowniept with natural 
resources lost relative importance in comparison:with industrialization 
as the determinant of growth. . The... structure of ; agricultural ownership 
and exploitation combined with sluggish,, external . demand j iÀrhilè external 
supply was often made easier by attractive loa,nsi meant 'that thè 
pressure of domestic demand on the agricultural sector vías not 
particularly strong. It is true that #t.rthe end of the 'period in 
some countries there was a sharp rise in the surface area harvested; 
but the pressure on the sector is of little,importance if: a comparison 
is made between such increases and the.,.potential «.f land which could 
be cultivated, between present yields :and. those of;r the1 developed' ;; ' 
countries, or between the land currently under cultivation and the 
area needed if there were changes in.spil,,use ,and diet¿o vo 
The demand for mining resources was,,not . very strong ji'n this ' • '*'••' 
period, áhd external demand continued to be predominant. The major 
importing countries opted, for a policy of diversification of supply 
which caused mining to flourish in other regions of the; world where 
such resources had hitherto only been exploited sparingly. As a 
result, Latin America's share in world trade of,; the main minerals 
declined. Only in recent years did the, vigorous industrial development 
of the larger countries of the region cause domestic demand to appear 
as a factor which could lead to growth of.the sector and to pressuré 
on the resources in question. 
The région as a whole continued to be a net exporter of energy 
resources. However, production grew at a.lower rate than consumption 
since the pricè of petroleum was relatively low, particularly in the 
Sixties. Countries with an energy deficit increased their oil imports 
from the Middle East to the detriment of local prospection or 
production and of the use of other sources of energy. It was only 
. ; /in 1973, 
in 1973, as a result of the rise .in, oil, prices, that the pressure oil 
energy resources bé'gan to be felt. pnce .again,. and naturally i;t • 
continued to be thé Àain area;of-ao^çern over'the following:years» , 
Social change o • ti • • , ' 
As indicated at the outset, this economic dynamism) was ., , ' 
accompanied by serious problems .and,contradictions. c îts:iinost ;k§rmful 
features were related to the .social and political•Structure on-which 
it v/as based, and therefore; .an- .overall assessment calls.' for the..study 
of the social changés which .-accompanied the ecohomiĉ growt/ĥ ..,. 
These changes were in many;.ways very draétic but they di.d,.ono.t 
•fulfil the prediction's 'of - the ¿development ideôlbgy ' ôf the- ¡Fifties, 
which assumed that* withouitrsocial and economic reforms-..aîid-̂ thp . ? 
bolstering of capital fdrmatio.n wi/th external àssistahce, .it would 
be impossible to maintain stable .governments or defiôcratiç .values. 
The underprivilegèd; position..-of . lar.ge groups 'of the population gave 
grounds to believe that: the.re: -w,as. a good possibility' o.f revolution 
on the part of the deprived,particularly; thé "agra'cul/tur armasses. 
The governing groups there fore,jiccepted, at" ièaèt ;;in"'part, ; th^ reform 
platform promising to make-possible a society with''à; broader, social 
consensus. Hbw'eVer'i'''-in;-'":t'hfe -.cp̂ rsf. .of the following - t'aient y-five, 
years no substantial-changes occurred in the great- ma jority ,pf-. the 
countries in terms of access to pwnership or iiicbme on: the part of 
: the .majority of the 'population,, nor,, any other fundamental changes 
which would give the underprivileged groups a really more egalitarian 
position. : 
Social change was strongly influenced' by two long-standing 
factors of great quantitative importance: population growth and 
rural-urban migration. 
Between 1950 and 1975, the average population --growth rate 
amounted to 2.8 per cent, and the region's population"rose, from 
l60 to 315 million inhabitants... Rural areas and smalls rtowns, with 
under twenty thousand inhabitants accounted for three-quarters of 
the population in 1950 and about half in 1975- This striking, change 
in twenty-five years caused the.population exploâion of the large 
/cities. '*In 
cities. In 1950 Latin America had six or seven cities with over one 
miiixoii inhabitants, -whiles- in, 19:80it,,wil-1 have twenty-five. At 
present there is one pity with over .10.million inhabitants (Mexico 
City), and three others tare vclose. to. t^iat-figu^e (Buenos Aires, Rio 
de Janeiro and Sao Paulo). 
The •demogi'aphi.c-- pa-tdb.erBS-j.an̂  .fcjrejyis ..c.onjt.inue to be very 
different in the • -indiviidual-T̂ oUiB-t-riê  r..-Pour, countries which account 
for approximately 15 per cent of the region's population have now 
achieved moderate'populationr growth rates... In. three of them, 60 per 
cent or more of the.̂  population-was. u^ban .in 197.0, while the rural 
population v/as constant and only contributed moderately to urban 
'growth. Five large or medium-sized countries with about 68 per cent 
of the population have rates which are equal to.or above the Latin 
American average. They all reasonably ejcpect these rates to begin 
to decline by the end of the Seventies. They also have high rates 
of urbanization'and relatively.. low-., rural population growth rates 
(about 1.5 per cent annually). The remaining countries, which account 
for approximately 16..per pent; of ,the population, are relatively small 
and rural With high fcopu^ation .growth rates, which will not soon 
decline since they also; have high mortality rates which can be 
reduced. Rural growth rates . continue to be high at . between Z and 
3 per cent per year. .. . , 
This high urban growth led to great demands on society, as 
had been foreseen in the post-war period. It was then assumed that 
industrialization and the;expansion; of public services would provide 
an occupational counterpart for rural-urban migration, while urban 
planning was to control and: regulate urban mushroom growth. 
In absolute terms, the occupational achievements of 
industrialization and the public services might be considered 
satisfactory. In the context of. urban populations with a 5 per cent 
growth rate, however, they are inadequate. The job deficit has been 
made good by the activities of the so-called informal, sectors, which 
have managed:to adapt and stabilize themselves in the urban societies 
and now form a system which generates its own forms of demand and 
supply. 
/New population 
New population étrata weré created through the functioning of 
the modern and informal sectors. Within the occupational structure, 
the share of thè "high" òr "middle" occupation groups 1/ has 
increased, which is an indication of thé urban economy's capacity 
to foster the formation of high and middle-levèl social strata (see 
table Int. 2). Contrary to expectations in the 1960s, the percentages 
in unskilled jobs in the tertiary sector,2/ have tended to remain 
constant rather than increase. Naturally their absolute level rose 
considerably, with a great impact On the problem of distribution. 
To summarize, the occupational Structuré did not create serious 
problems of open ùnemjpìòymfenti but -the strata were clearly; divided-
into those which managed'to become part òf the more dynamic and 
"modern" production sectors and services'and those excluded from 
them. . 
The problems unquestionably exceeded .the capacity of urban 
planning, and the State1s response to the challenges of urban growth was 
primarily concentrated in housing'policie's. Here, however, it was 
the middle: strata'which had greatest access to the benefits ensuing 
from government action, incidentally showing their ability to mobilize 
politically. Government urban policy was unable to avert a growing 
split within the large cities. On the one side there arose modern 
districts, far from the c'én-tres and depending on the use of the 
motorcar; on thè other, the unsatisfactory human settlements housing 
thé power strata and built largely by their occupants. State policy 
for these settlements hardly advanced beyond minimal public services 
and social assistance in view of the: amount of resources needed for 
a modern housing or urbanization programme. 
1/ 
2/ 
In general, ;npn-.manual occupations ranging from employers and 
professionals to salaried employees and salesmen. 
Salaried employees in services or own-account workers and 
unpaid family members working in the service sector. 
/The political 
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: .The, political control of. these large urban groups has been a 
recurrent preoccupation of the authorities and the better-off urban 
population» .For the mpst .part, however, a combination of a small but 
effective amount of real,, opportunity, moderate consumption gains, 
hopes of progress, minimal welfare policies and more or less latent 
repression has been, sufficient to kpe,p the disadvantaged position of 
, the settlements from generating disrupting protests to the extent 
frequently predictad. sinpe.the 1950s», ; 
The rural situation,,continues to be. worse than the urban. 
Absolute poverty,in large strata and a maldistribution of ownership 
and power were and continue to be characteristic of rural life. In 
the,,Fifties;.and...at. the beginning of the Sixties it was believed that 
agricultural, reform was a,.solution to rural, problems which was also 
coherent with industrialization. It was assumed that the State, 
businessmen in industry,-the urban middle classes and.wage-earners 
. and .t̂ e . rural masses had a common interest in a policy which would. 
lead to a more efficient, use of land ..and. rural .labour, higher 
production,, higher inpopes which would open up new markets for 
manufactures .and, agricultural.inputs;and psp̂ e , the.* way for rural 
democracy and the.organization of groups which would,break the power 
of. the ,l3nd-,owning sectors opposed to.• development. ̂  §ut. the high 
cost and slow courserpf,agrarian reform, and above all the fact that 
the other groups involved could achieve most of their objectives at 
the expense; of ..the rural population which did not react as. strongly 
as expected, ' tpok the ¡wind out of the ¡process.. •. .-•,•. 
The slow or difficult course, of agrarian reform g?tve rise to 
a number of formulae which .were generally presented as being 
complementary but which turned out to be alternatives. The most 
important were colonization and the relocation of the rural poor 
based on the expansion of the agricultural frontier, agricultural 
extension services (essentially the provision of public services to 
rural areas), the creation of agricultural unions and basic 
organizations, and community development policies designed to 
co-ordinaJte..and unify other initiatives.. : , 
; - ; , /As a 
As a result of the economic development of the system and the 
scant effect of most of the policies, the problems detected in the 
past largely continued into the present in rural areas. At the 
same time, there were a number ¡of important changés. First, a 
modern commercial'farming economy has emerged, primarily in the big 
estates, which morè than any other group have taken advantage of the 
infrastructureiprovidëd by the State and of agricultural- extension 
in the form of technology.;̂  Second, agrarian reforms did redeem some 
of the rural population from extreme poverty. Others managed to 
enter the commercial economy or acquire non-agricultural sources of 
income•in.transpbrt, trade and artisanal and other activities. In 
the eyes of those who failed to: do so, however, all these successes 
only-*increased the: gap between-'themselves and the others, increasingly 
a mass of landlèss, seasonal wage-earners With no means of defending 
their own interests;*• Finally, although significant progress was made 
in the field of rural'education and'health, the rural-urban gap 
continued or grew largèr. : \ r r. • 
Salient aspects of écbnoriiic development " 
The most significant aspects of Latin American dèvelopniéiit-dver 
the-last -25 jreâré arë those connected with the4transformation of 
production, the productive capacity of the principal agents, thé 
inequalities in-the access of the population strata to the fruits 
of the economic process aùd the degree of autonomy of thé region in 
relation to the exterior. t jT ' ' 
The economic dynamisni brought about a far-reaching'trarisformation 
in thé structure of production.. The product of the région increased 
almost four times between 1950 and 1975, manufacturing production 
increased five times, th'e production of cement six times, energy 
eight times, machinery iând equipment ninè times and steel fiftéen 
times. These major changes of scale were linked with substantive 
changes in the structure of supply. 
The region became industrialized and attained a position where 
it was able to provide in an increasingly autonomous manner for the 




structure which includes non-durable industrial goods and important 
lines of durables^ Certain sectors of basic inputs such as steel 
and petrochemicals -/symbols of the first stages of heavy industry -
are already functioning in many countries of the region. However •  
consumer.expectationsv encouraged by the modern communications media, 
are spreading to increasingly extensive groups of the population., • 
The supplies that would.be needed to satisfy these demands far 
exceed the region's capacity. Thus, if the industrial structure is. 
seen inirelation to the sophisticated levels of demand of the high 
and middle-^level groups and of those who aspire to and attain entry 
to those groups, the disequilibrium between aspirations and actual 
possibilities which, prevailed during the 1950s is no less intense 
now. Similarly, although the scale of production is impressive in 
absolute terms it.is less so when compared "with what would be • : 
required tocresolve the problems of/critical poverty which affect a 
significant-proportion of the'population. Thus the achievements made 
are magnified when seen in the context of the population incorporated 
into the modern sectors but are sopewhat-diminished when regarded in 
relation to the population as a whole,;-
The ̂.transformation of production has also altered the scale, 
composition and relative;importance of foreign trade. Exports 
reached a value of nearly billion dollars in 1975c,; Although Latin. 
America's share in world trade fell from 9-per cent to 5 per cent 
between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, the region has become very 
important client for capital goods and industrial inputs from the 
central countries. This represents significant negotiating potential 
which the region has not yet fully utilized and also creates a 
possible field for substitution and trade expansion within the 
region which is of great importance. —Unfortunately, however, in 
recent years the balance-of-rpayments deficits have considerably 
increased foreign borrowing and the concomitant amortization and 
service payments, which.in many countries absorb high percentages 
of the purchasing power of exports. 
/Whatever the 
Whatever the context in which the analysis is made, it is 
undeniablè that the most dynamic production agents, the State and 
the transnational enterprises, have shown a capacity for mobilizing 
resources in large-scale projects which is one of the most significant 
aspects of the period. The national governments'and the public 
enterprises'in the key sectors' of the infrastructure and of basic 
resources,'in particular, 'have fnade impressive achievements. The 
capacity of State rnanagémèrit was';considerably superior in 1975 to 
past levels. A technocracy has béën emerging which is capable' of 
managing policies-to mobilize very high proportions of the resources 
of the economy. In some'countries the large public entërprisës 
have attained dimensions which put them on a competitive scale at 
the world level. "•' ' -
The unequâl access of the different population strata to the 
fruits of growth is One df thé aspects of the development process 
over the last twenty-fivë years which is most open to-criticism. 
This inequality dfigiriates'both from the distribution of ther 
ownership of the means of production and from the heterogeneous and 
insufficient prôvisiôh'ôf capital in' the different production 
Sectors. ' ."*...•,.-...- -..- -.- : •:.-.••••:'.•• i ' r'." 
1 Thé unequal distribution of the ownership of natural resources 
which prevailed at the beginning of the 1950s was the object of 
great political concern but in practice has not been substantially 
altered in favour of the least privileged. The difficulties' 
confronted by agrarian reform have already bèeri commented on. -It 
was in the agricultural sector that it seemed possible, at the 
beginning of the 1950s, to secure a greater redistribution of 
propërty and that excessive size did riot appear to be heeded to take 
advantage of economies of scale. The: sector was also suitable for 
experiments in co-operative forms;:of production or ownership. The 
figures available for the end of the 1960s show that in these 
aspects neither agrarian reform noT any other type of measures tried 
in this respect have led to major advances. Indeed, the^situation 
seems to havé been very much the révérée", as there appears to have 
.• - /been an 
- 12-
been an increase in the number of rural wage-earners who have no 
access to the ownership or use of land, even in limited amounts for 
family sustenance. 
This evolution was accompanied by another process of particular 
significance, namely thê  emergence of a new type of rural entrepreneur 
who, taking full advantage of the technical find infrastructure. 
services set up by the government, responded very dynamically to the., 
stimuli of demand. The development of the modern agricultural 
enterprise has undoubtedly had an important effect on the growth of 
production and the assimilation of technological progress, but at . 
the same time in.practice it discourages the decisions on and 
application of agrarian .reform programmes and constitutes a factor 
in the expulsion of labour from agriculture. 
In mining and energy, resources the natural tendencies to 
concentration deriving from the ..technical nature of the operations . • 
involved have been confirmed by the growing predominance of 
ownership by public enterprises. V/hen, for political motives, these 
enterprises have increased employment beyond what is strictly 
necessary or have fixed low prices for their.,products of mass 
consumption, this has produced a redistributive effect at least in 
the medium and short term both for the strata .yrhich obtain employment 
and for those which, utilize, the products..: .-,... 
The manufacturing sector is the one which has grown most <,., 
intensively, and it did so from very low levels, so that a major 
part of its structure was created over the last twenty-five years, 
In many sectors the economies of scale require, plants of large 
dimensions which, added to the monopolistic trends, leads to a 
heavy concentration of ownership. Transnational and public 
enterprises have been the main agents in the most .dynamic sectors, 
and they have brought about an increasing concentration of industrial. 
property. 
The trend towards concentration seems to have extended even 
to sectors which were traditionally dispersed, such as the retail 
trade. It is also significant that foreign capital is not r .,. 
/concentrated only 
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concentrated only in dynamic and technologically complex industrial 
sectors but also reaches sectors such as that of commerce, where 
the contribution is necessarily of lesser or slight importance for 
the countries. 
The concentration of ownership in economic activities has 
favoured the expansion of the. middle and high-income groups. The ' 
increasing size of .the. middles-level groups which generally 
originated from lower income sectors and worked in sectors of lesser 
productivity is in itself a manifestation of the favourable effect 
of the expansion of this form of ownership. The effect on the urban 
wage-earners of these sectors has also been generally favourable. 
For those excluded, however, the situation has meant that the very 
inadequate distribution of income which prevailed at the beginning 
of the period has persisted for more than half the population. Of 
course even in this group it is possible to distinguish some sub-
groups which have gained absolute improvements of some significance, 
but in comparison with the consumer structures which the system 
itself encourages these improvements are seen to be absolutely 
inadequate. 
In order to alleviate this deficient distribution of income, 
the State carried out a policy of public spending during the first 
two decades designed to meet the minimum needs, especially in the 
sphere of services. The State activities in the sphere of education 
and health were the most successful forms of action. The major fall 
in illiteracy and the increasing proportions of the population given 
access to primary, secondary and university education undoubtedly 
represented a redistribution of services of considerable value. 
The population increases, resulting largely from the fall in 
mortality rates and the increases in life expectancy, are by 
themselves indicative of the successes in the sphere of health. 
If the indicators are studied in terms of social groups, however, 
the impressive improvements in some strata again leave the marginal 
groups in an even worse situation. Thus the success of the middle-
level groups in gaining access to secondary and higher education, 
/the health 
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the health services and other benefits deriving from public action 
leaves the indicators of the least-privileged groups, especially the 
rural poor, even further removed from the average values of the 
country than in the past« 
The red'i'stributive effects .of this policy began to diminish 
in importance as the requirements of economic growth brought about 
a change of emphasxs in public spending towards investment in the 
material production sectors, to the detriment of the services. 
/I. SOCIAL 
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I. SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE'PERIOD 1970-75 AND THE 
PROBLEM 'OF UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT 
The main non-economic factors entering into the transformation 
of Latin America since 1950 have been touched on in the preceding 
chapter and can be recapitulated as follows: 
1. The population has grown and experienced spatial redistribution 
and concentration with unprecedented rapidity. Half of a population that 
has more than doubled since 1950 is now urban and urban predominance is 
bound to increase steadily. 
2« While the rural population and the rural econongr have become 
modernized and internally differentiated in many respects, the welfare 
gap between city and countryside has not narrowed. The majority of the 
rural population continues to experience extreme poverty> powerlessness, and 
discrimination in public social allocations. The breakdown of traditional 
tenure systems and the forms taken by agricultural modernizètion have 
increased the relative importance of the landless underemployed rural 
proletariat. 
3« In the urban areas, heterogeneous "middle" strata, mainly 
engaged in non-manual salaried occupations, have grown much more rapidly 
than either the groups of manual workers in industry and basic services 
or the groups classified as "marginal", "sub-proletarian", etc. . This 
differential growth of urban middle strata has sustained and been 
sustained by exceptionally rapid expansion of secondary and higher education, 
and by the expansion of public and private white-collar employment 
absorbing the products of this education. It has been accompanied by the 
entrenchment of "modern" consumption patterns in sizable minorities of 
the urban population. This market has shaped and been ; shaped-by the lines 




4« The greater part of the urban population in most countries has 
shared to some extent in national per capita income gains, although these 
gains have been very unevenly distributed, the upper and upper-middle 
strata receiving the lion's share. The greater part of the rural population 
has gained little or nothing. The dependent modernization and diversifica-
tion of consumption patterns, however, have meant an increasing strain on 
incomes at all levels below the highest, with apparent neglect of basic 
consumption needs in favour of durable goods, indebtedness, and perceptions 
of relative poverty and insecurity accompanying improvements in monetary 
incomes. 
5« Increasing shares of public sector resources and of national 
incomes have been allocated to social services, particularly education; 
there have been more irregular and intermittent increases in, allocations 
supporting the consumption levels of certain population groups, particularly . 
through public housing and subsidized distribution of foods. These 
allocations have for the most part been biased in favour of the urban 
middle strata and, .have commonly reinforced, rather than counteracted the 
prevailing inequalities in income distribution. They have generated strong 
interest groups — the functionaries of the services as well as,the 
clienteles — pressing for further expansion along the same lines. 
6. Shifts in the distribution of power in the societies have not 
been accompanied in most countries, by any significant enhancement of 
popular participation in decision-making. The relative importance of 
landowning oligarchies has declined, and there has been a trend toward the 
sharing of power between techno-bureaucracies (military as well as 
civilian) and major industrial and financial interests, increasingly 
dominated by transnational enterprises. The former have been increasingly 
emboldened to seek control by their own rising technical capacity, and also 
by the apparent inability of "normal" political processes of interest-
group representation and bargaining to manage the social conflicts generated 
by rapid change and increasing inequality, to apply coherent criteria for 
allocation of resources, and to represent national interests vis-a-vis the 




Since the beginning of the 1970*s the national societies have 
experienced a series of stimuli and shocks, mainly originating outside • 
the region, that have accentuated the contradictions in the prevailing 
style of dependent capitalist development, heightened social tension and 
insecurity, and also strengthened the trend toward technobureaucratic 
tactics aimed at suppression of thé contradictions and shoring up of the 
viability of the prevailing style. The•stimuli and shocks have much in 
common with those experienced-in the high-income industrialized countries 
during the same years, as might be expected from the stages of moderniza-
tion, urbanization, and industrialisation achieved by the Latin American 
societies. Naturally they have'affected the individual countries in 
differing combinations and with somewhat different timing, depending on 
factors ranging from the character-of the main export products to the 
level of political mobilization previously reached, and these combinations 
have generated widely differing reactions from the societies and the 
governments. Cuba, with its radically different style of development 
requires a separate" discussion. The Cuban experience has exerted an 
influence, through its demonstration of the viability and also, the 
difficulties of an âlternative style of development, on trends in the 
rest of Latin America, that has becomè in some ways more pronounced since 
1970, with the overcoming of Cuba isolation. The highly simplified vision 
of the social impact of recent stimuli and shocks that is attempted below, 
however, applies only to the countries with market economies, however ' 
much the role of the market may have been modified by planning and growth 
of the public sector: 
1. The high rates of economic growth and exceptionally favourable 
export prices in the early 1970»s described in Chapter 2, strengthened 
confidence in the viability of the prevailing style of development, further 
stimulated the consumer society and the domestic industries supplying it, 
and permitted the state to relieve social tensions by expanding social 
services, by assistential programmes, and above all by absorbing in 
public employment an important part of the rising output of secondary and 
/higher education. 
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higher education. This brief euphoria has been followed, mainly since 
1974, by new deteriorations in terms of trade, intensifying debt servicing 
problems, etc.»reducing resources available to the governments and forcing 
austerity policies negating the social aspirations stimulated in the 
immediate past. Inflation has become Important in practically all 
countries and has reached unprecedented levels in the minority of countries 
in which the different social strata has learned to live with chronic . 
inflation (those of the "Southern Cone")« Open unemployment has risen, 
the barriers to absorption of women and youth seeking to enter the labour 
force have become more formidable, and it is probable that the ability 
of the poorer urban and rural strata to maintain minimum levels of 
consumption is deteriorating, although this conclusion depends on very 
fragmentary information and observations. At the same time, a deterioration 
in the real incomes, levels of consumption, and employment prospects of 
major parts of the middle strata that have become wedded to the "consumerist" 
style of development is evident, although some groups continue to gain; 
consumer purchasing power and consumer goods industries have suffered. 
A particularly striking change in several countries is the sudden halt 
to the phenomenally rapid expansion of enrolment in higher education, and 
the accompanying governmental campaigns to freeze or reduce the bureau-
cratic employment that previously absorbed an important proportion of 
the output of higher education. The political problems posed by the 
plight of the relatively organized and articulate middle strata are, at 
least in the short term, probably more disquieting to governments than the 
plight of the relatively unorganized and voiceless poor. The phenomena 
noted here may be only temporary and similar shocks have occurred in the 
past. It is striking, however, that the substantial economic growth and 
the rising levels of consumption and social services achieved by a large 
part of the Latin American population have not mitigated their 
psychological impact; consumption aspirations have continually advanced 
ahead of the. capacity o.f the economies to satisfy them and even temporary 
/stagnation brings 
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stagnation brings-:intov(j[iestion the'political as well as economic f ' 
viability of the whole style of -development. r v 
2. The beginning of the 1970's saw a great deal of innovation in 
governmental social policies, with the coming to power of new combinations 
of social forces or, in a larger number of cases, the emergence of a 
technobureaucratic elite determined to achieve a style of development 
incorporating a larger measure of social' justice and popular participation. 
These innovations co-existed contradictorily with the complacency induced 
by the favourable economic conjuncture, and were accorded wide acceptance 
in principle. The objectives have not been achieved owing partly to the 
inability of governments pursuing new objectives to cope with the demands 
and resistances arising within the societies, partly to contradictions 
in objectives and inefficiency in ekeciitiori of" policies, partly to 
external factors and more recently to the impact of international economic 
crises arri inflation on the resources needed to carry out major 
redistributive programmes in the absence of a high degree of social 
consensus and discipline. Sòme national authorities justify the reversion 
to policies of fiscal austerity and renunciation of controls over market 
forces, as a temporary concession to harsh realities. Others are 
convinced that this is the only sound strategy for development over the 
long term. In either case, in societies ih which different classes have 
achieved a significant degree of mobilization and expectations of continued 
improvement in their lot, thè risks are obvious; unmanageable social conflicts 
further disrupting the economies, haphazard concessions to the organized 
groups best able to resist austerity policies, authoritarian tactics, to 
repress dissent. 
3» While the stimuli and shocks affect the urban population most 
visibly they are also exacerbating the tensions previously present in the 
rural population. Favourable markets for agricultural exports have helped 
to speed up the capitalist modernization of agriculture and the marginaliza-
tion of small cultivators and workers dependent on the traditional 
/hacienda system. 
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hacienda system, Slumps in export markets 'have; then' deduced the demand 
for agricultural wage labour, and also strained'the capacity of the 
countries to import basic foods. The plpJLity. of the cities to., absorb 
migrants into activities in the so-called ^informal sector" is, at least 
temporarily, shrinking, and so are the opportunities for temporary labour 
migration to richer countries — . a change of considerable, importance.,in , 
the case of Mexico vis-a-vis. the United States. Agrariapf reforms that have 
benefitted sizable minorities of the rural population in a few countries 
but that have remained on paper in the majority seem to have reached a 
deaci end in both cases; for the most part they now lack national political 
backing, since agricultural modernization seems to have taken an 
irreversibly different course, and they have found no .answer to the plight 
of the poorest rural strata, inevitably excluded from any,tenure reform 
aimed at economically viable small foldings or co-operatives. In their 
combination, these factors imply an intensification.of rural poverty and a 
narrowing of the alternatives previously open to the rural masses —r which 
were meagre at best. Rising levels of .rural social, conflict, particularly 
in the form of land seizures, +are evident in. pairtso.f certain countries, 
but in general the declining, relative weight ..of ti}.e. rural, population and the 
vigorous growth in some lines of, agricultural production leave rural ; . 
impoverishment unable to force itself on the attention of governments ànd 
urban public opinion. , 
The past cycles of rapid economic growth and crises forcing, 
internal economic innovations, a,cœmpanied by rather unbalanced, and 
precarious expansion and diversification^of the social, groups able to. make. 
themselves heard in the political process, have been adverse.to effective,, 
planning, in spite of the institutionalization of planning mechanisms in 
most countries since the 1950's, or to the achievement of egaiitarian social 
policies. In prosperous years the argument that economic growth by itself 
would év&Httia-lly -'ëllmihàte" ̂ v^Hy^a^'unemployinsnb seemed plausible. In 
years of Crisis the arguant prevailed that this was no time" for costly 
and probably disruptive rëdistiibutïve refôms. A piecemeal agglomeration 
/of social 
of social measures responding to group pressures and th§ models offered 
by the'higfo-incoftie countries tookrplace, ;and,̂ me;.,of;'them had a ipajor 
impact on the sooî tieffffand the eco^oiae^ tiutrthey did not respond . 
to any overall conception pf-.-their-pl̂ ce in a development strategy. 
Arguments that; things should be done differently, that the social services 
should be planned so as to contribute, simultaneously to productivity .. 
and social equality were not lacking, but, were unable to change the 
overall trend. • v.-
The achievements apd shortcomings of economic development during . 
the I9601s, as they «entered into tfie .consciousness of political leaders, 
social scientists and planners, seemed, to., demonstrate the urgency and also 
the possibility of acting .̂ differently and more coherently. The national 
societies had achieved a much greater material capacity and also technical-
administrative capacity to do so-. ̂  While foraial planning had not been 
particularly effective, the relative impqrtance .of the public sector in. 
national life had,grown considerably, and. the technobureaucracies managing 
it had gained experience and confidence. It had also become .more obvious 
•that-the existing processes of economic growth and social-.change would 
not lead spontaneously to a wider diffusion of the fruits of development 
or to greater national autonomy. Thus the theme :of "unified .development" 
or "unified: approach to development", whichrhad-in fact been present in 
many variants-and under different names in.the .discussions of planning 
•sincethe 19501s, came,;to -.theyfore. vT.o its ̂proponents this mjsant a . . 
development strategy achieving,a.high rate of economic growth (and at the 
same time ; changing the structure of growth, the allocation of public = 
resources, the content and distribution of social services^ the patterns 
of-consumption, and the patterns of human relationships, so as to correspond 
to-the human welfare and human rights, objectives set forth in numerous -
,international;declaratipns. 1 . 
: The ̂experiences of the. early 1970's: in Latin America demonstratey 
unfortunately, that the acceptance of general formulations on "unified 
development" did not amount to a real commitment to application in the 
/face of 
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face of the stimuli arid shocks that have been described above* The 
formulations themselves have justifiably been criticized as "Utopias 
by aggregation of objectives", masking the lack of agreement by their 
sponsors on any unified theory of social change. The capacity for real 
integration of objectives has also been strained by the series of 
international campaigns of recent years — on population, the human 
environment, habitat, employment, equality of t'hé ¿exes, etc. -- all 
legitimate in themselves, but pointing tò different approatììies and 
priorities that have been "unified" only by juxtaposition. The limited 
adaptability of the material and technical resources generated by the 
prevailing style of development in Latin'America, "and above all of the 
expectations of the greater part of the population'té»' thè requlréiièntè of 
radically diffèrétìV "unified" styles has become blearer. "§oi has the 
extent to which the decision-making capacity "of- the"'national'' at^hoHties 
that have struggiéci toward "urdfied SeveÌopiuent'" ià restricted bjp'the 
character of their political base, the compartmentalization of the 
administrative apparatus, the entrenchment of the transnational 
enterprises, the identification of the mass communication media with the 
consumer society, and other factors of internal as well as external origin. 
The present reactions to crisis demonstrate.once again the ambivalence of 
attitudes toward thè prevailing.style of-development. On the one hqnd, there 
is wide recognition of its precariousness and inability to conceive of its 
projection into the future on an ever larger scale without transformation. 
On the other, there is a^continuing inability to formulate convincing 
strategies for transformation and plausible agents of transformations The 
stage of dependent semi-development and societal differentiation reached 
by the larger countries of.'Latin America seems to rule out strategies that 
might be open to: poorer, mòtte homogeneous and more predominantly rural 
societies, as well as strategies that might be open to societies that are 
fully industrialized or even "post-ihdustidal", with more- .ample per capita 
resources that' can be redistributed 'with rotative efficiency and public 
/consensus through 
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consensus through the state. "Unified development", if it is to achieve 
operational meaning in the Latin American context, must meet the realities 
of internally heterogeneous and conflictive societies undergoing change 
processes that at present either escape the control of apy coherent social 




II. ECONOMIC TRENDS DURING, .THg. PERIOD 1970-1975 
1. Rate and structures Qf-economic growth 
(a) Global trends: rise and fall of the rhythm of economic growth 
In the context of the ëcbnoèié and social proceës déscribed in 
the Introduction and in the preceding chapter, the evolution of the 
Latin American economy during the current decade is linked with three 
aspects of particular significance because of the influence they have 
had and'their later effects and ¡repercussions. These are changes or 
new measures in economic policy, particularly in respect of foreign 
relations, the dëvelopment of the prevailing international situation 
and the rise in petroleum prices. 
Since the middle-of the last decade the Latin American countries 
have made progress in adopting measures and policies designed to 
accelerate economic growth along thé'lines -of-'greater opening towards 
the exterior by encouraging the"expansion and diversification of 
exports and greater fleXibility: in the share of supplies of imports 
and promoting external investment and financing! At the same time, 
as is well known, thé international situation underwent far-reaching 
changes over'récent yéarà-because of the cycle of the industrial 
countries and the risé in petroleum prices and-evolved in ëûccessive 
stages from'-boom to recession and uncertainty, culminating in the 
efforts which are now being made in the central countriés to' récover 
their rate of-growth. 
These and'other.aspects explain, on the one hand, thé progress of 
Latin America in joining up with the international economy and the 
changes in the structure of its foreign relations and, on thé other, 
the marked fluctuations in its rate of growth, which has passed from 
intense dynamism to a marked slackening off•in the non-pëtrôleUm-
exporting countries, as well as the high balance-of-^payments deficits 
and the foreign borrowing of these coumtries which represent an 
awkward bottleneck in respect of the subsequent increase of national 
investment and the national product. The situation and prospects of 
/the Latin 
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the Latin American petroleum-exporting countriés are of course 
different, as they have benefited from an appreciable increase in 
their real income and have strengAhëiiàiifrtheir capacity of economic 
development.:j , 
During the .first years of this decade, especially during the 
biennium 1972-I973, economic growth accelerated and the gross 
domestic product of .the region as a whole showed an average annual 
rate of increase of 7 per cent. Some countries had exceptionally 
high rateB, including Brazil,, the,;country of the greatest economic 
and demographic size, which attained,a, growth rate of 10 per cent. 
Most of thç countries had lower rates of. growth., than the average, 
but it should be noted that in general they tended to.improve in 
comparison, with their past evolution (see - table II-l). 
During this period the physical volumes of exports and the 
ratio of tfye terms of trade reached fairly favourable.levels« The 
exports grew at rates (around; 8. per. cent a year r,for the region), 
which were double those of the,previous decade, and the terras of 
trade improved for almost. al£- the, countries. The..external financing 
available for the region was-also greater than that of previous 
years, although highly concentrated in Brazil and Mexico. 
This evolution chapged. radically during the bienn.ium 197/+-1975« 
The petrolëum-exporting countries benefited from a substantial 
improvement in thé purchasing power of their exports and consequently 
increased their real income (see table II-2) while in most of the 
Other countries the evolution was unfavourable, first affecting 
their balance of. payments and then.drastically reducing the growth 
of the product.:. , 
In 1974 the slackening of external demand due to the economic 
recession in the industrial countries and the deterioration of the 
terms of trade caused by the rise in the prices of imports and in 
particular of petroleum had an adverse effect on the non-petroleum-
exporting countries, in which group the purchasing power of. eieports 
remained practically stationary. In general, no restrictive measures 
were adopted in these countries and economic growth was largely 
maintained by the current programmes and investments*. Imports rose at an 
extraordinary rate of 20 per cent and the product by around 7 per cent. 
/This was 
This was possible, as can be clearly seen, at the cost of a 
high deficit in the current account of the balance of payments which 
rose from around US$ 4,300 million in 1973 to US$ 13,000 million in 
1974, financed pa~rtly by utilizing the reserves and largely with 
private foreign capital, mainly from banking sources. 
In 1975 these unfavourable trends became even more acute for 
the non-petroleum-exporting cbuntries;"" This can also be seen from 
the statistical figures for this group of countries. The volume of 
exports remained almost stationary and at the same time there was 
an intensification of the deterioration of the terms of trade, so 
that as a result the purchasing power of the value of exports 
diminished by around 10 per cent. The. countries most affected by 
this situation adopted restrictive and controlling measures to reduce 
the volume of their imports, but in spite of this the deficit of the 
balance of payments Continued to rise (US$ 16,400 million). In this 
context the rate of growth of the* product fell drastically since it 
amounted to only 1.9 per cent, which was lower than the rate of : : 
demographic increase. 
The indicators of real income, obtained by adding the gross ! 
domestic product and the effect of the terms of trade, are highly 
indicative of these fluctuations which have occurred in various 
periods and Countries during the first five years of this decade. 
As can be seen in table H*-2 real income showed rates of variation 
higher than ;those of the product in 1973 and in 1975 many of the 
indicators Showed a fall in the real income for many countries. 
Venezuela is a special case since in 1974 its real income rose by 
more than 45 per cent. 
If the period 1970-1975 is considered as a whole, it can be 
seen that the gross domestic product of the region grew at an 
average annual rate of approximately 6 per cent. Of the 19 countries 
for which full information is available, only 6 had a rate of 6 per 
cent or more. They are Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador and Paraguay; Venezuela should be added 'to this 
list if the evolution of its real income is considered rather than 
/that of 
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that of the gross domestic product. The 12 other countries registered 
rates of economic growth of less than 6 per cent a year and they 
represent somewhat more than half of the Latin American population» 
Among these are- three countries which had average annual growth rates 
of less than 3 per cent a year. 
Table II-3 provides information on the annual. evolution of the 
per capita gross domestic product. It can be seen Jiov/ this per capita 
index tended to improve after the-middle of the past decade; however, 
the reduction in the absolute levels of the per capita product during 
1975 influenced the fall in the average rate of growth to a figure of 
3 per cent a year during this 5-year per.iod. 
(b) Changes in the sectoral composition of the product • 
During the first three years of the 1970s the, trends towards 
industrialization which have characterized the transformation of 
production over the last 25 years became accentuated in the region. 
In this aspect Latin America, is,reproducing, the global trends 
recorded in the developed economies»/although in different conditions. 
The share of manufacturing industry in the product increased 
from 23 per. cent in 1970 to 2k.2 per cent in 1973, and the physical 
volume of production rose at an average annual rate of .8*.6 per cent 
during this period. Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Colombia are cases 
of particular significance'as they attained growth rates of 13»7 per cent. 
12.2 per cent and 9«9 per cent respectively. (See table II-4.) 
Agricultural production, on the other hand, fell out of step.with this 
dynamism; its growth was less than in the previous decade and its share of 
the pro,duct fell from 14.9 per cent to 13«5 per cent. (See table II-5.) 
Developments during the two-year period 1974*-1975 illustrate . 
the influence of.industrial growth on growth rates. The overall 
downturn is associated with the sharp fall in the growth rates of. 
industry. In contrast, agriculture had an exceptional year in.1974, 
and in 1975 the growth rate, while lower, was higher.than that of . 
industry, showing that it was less open to the effects of the 
overall recession. . 
/The slow 
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The slow growth of agricultural production and its consequent 
loss of influence in the generation of the global product confirmed 
- in part - the sector's supply problems, the weakness of the demand 
of lower income groups and the generally limited direct effect of 
external agricultural demand on the composition of the total product, 
(c) Total supply and demand 
Economic growth during the 5-year period followed the lines of 
the previous decade in the sense that domestic demand continued to 
grow more rapidly than the demand for exports, except in 1972-1975 
when the latter rose in step with overall activity. (See table II-6.) 
The demand for consumer and capital goods grew at increasingly 
high rates during the first four years of the period, rising from 
6.6 per cent in 1971 to 9.4 per cent in 1974. V/hile consumption had 
steady rates in the order of 6.5 per cent, the,growth rate of 
investment rose from 8.7 per cent in 1971 to 15 per cent in 197^° In 
1975 the sharp fall in domestic demand affected capital goods much f • 
more than consumption goods. Except in the oil-producing countries, 
in 1975 there was a drop in investment and a very small increase in 
consumption. (See table 11-7») -
As was pointed out above, the demand for exports only rose 
with domestic demand during the 2-year period 1972-1973; it was 
practically stagnant in 1971 and 1974, and declinedfin 1975. -
The buoyancy of domestic demand brought great pressure on the 
productive capacity of the countries. The product grew, as stated 
earlier, and imports grew even more, with growth rates rising from,,-
4.7 per cent in 1971 to 20.7 per cent in 1974. Some countries 
reached very high rates, such as Brazil, whose imports rose by about 
16 per cent in 1971.and by 29 per cent in 1974. The same was true of the 
oil-exporting countries, where exports continued to rise in ,1975 while 
tending to be restrained in the other countries. (See table II-8.) 
Imports are particularly important in attaining the striking 
levels of investment. The domestic supply of capital goods could 
not have satisfied such vigorous demand in the short or even the 
/medium term. 
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medium term. As a result of the" growth of import's, the imports-
product ratio rose from only 10.6 per cent in 196'5 to 11.4 per cent 
in 1971 and '13«6 per cent in- 1974. 
(d) Investment, national saving and external financing 
Gross domestic investment grew at slightly over 10 per cent 
annually between 1971 and 1973 and at 15 per cent in 1974, ,in 
comparison with average rates of 5 per cent in the preceding decade. 
This high growth of investment stimulated and largely made possible 
the rapid growth of the product. 
This clearly reveals the existence of broad investment 
opportunities which it was possible to exploit, due to a noteworthy 
improvement" iiri the ̂ domestic capacity to mobilize resources. This 
general picture covers most of the region, and is- particularly true 
of a number of countries,- primarily Brazil:. > 
The growth of investment came to an abrupt halt in 1975 when • 
supply, very flexible hitherto, became rigid 'as- a result of the 
external situation. 
It is necessary to assess the significance of growth rates as 
high as those which occurred between 1970 and 1974: in 1974, investment 
was almost 55 per cent above the 1970 level. This means that in a 
very short time the region was able to renew much of the capital of 
the goods-producing sectors and of its infrastructure, as well as 
increase considerably its productive capacity. 
• As â consequence of the rapid growth of investment, the 
investment-gross domestic product ratio rose from an average 19«7 per 
cent in the 1960s to 24 per cent.in 1974, when 8 countries had rates' 
equivalent to or above that average (see table II-9). 
National saving was relatively important in the context of the 
prevailing style of growth; . ; 
Between 1971 and: 1974:, gross national saving as a percentage : 
of gross national income was clearly above the 18 per cent of ; the 
1960S, and slightly over 22 per cent in 1974. Excluding the oil-
exporting countries, which had the highest levels in the region, the 
countries whose saving ratios rose most were Argentina, Brazil and 
/Mexico. On 
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Mexico. On the other hand- in one group of countries, comprising 
Chile, Guatemala, Haiti and Uruguay, the national saving ratio in 
this period never reached 14 per cent, and in some it was under 
10 per cent. (See table IÏ-10.) 
Looking at thé côuntries of greater economic and demographic 
weight, it may be seen1 that thé marginal propensity to save was above 
the average propensity to"save èxcept in 1975• The national saving-
investment ratio rose during the first years of the period but fell 
in the last two years, and particularly in 1975« It should be 
stressed, however, that in the oil-èxp'ortirig countries this was not 
the case arid at least some of them were able to raise national saving 
more than domestic investment. Venezuela was an extreme case, since 
from 1973 onwards it became a net exporter of capital. (See table 11-11.) 
The external financing-investment ratio, which tended to fall at 
the beginning of the five-year periôd, rose considerably in 197^ and 
1975t reaching 15 per cent in 1975» more than double the average level 
of the 1960S. 
AS was stated earlier, this ratio is due to the intense use of 
external financing primarily in order to maintain specific levels 
of production and consumption and is not linked to a growth of domestic 
investment. . . . 
/2. Foreign 
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2. Foreign trade, the balance of payments 
and external indebtedness 
(a) Exports 
It is difficult to point to stable trends in the growth rate 
of the volume of exports either for countries or for periods. 
Instead, exports are characterized by their marked fluctuations, 
and it was only in the two-year period 1972-1973 that the great 
majority of the countries shared in the-benefits of the greater 
demand caused by the rapid giowth of the developed countries. In 
that two-year period, taking the region as a whole, the growth 
rates were around 8 per cent: i.e., markedly superior to those 
attained in the previous decade. 
In a few countries - especially Êfrazil, the Dominican Republic 
and Ecuador - high average artnuai growth'rates were maintained during 
the peiiod 1971-1974, hut other countries such, as Argentina suffered 
from severe annual swings between growth and decline. 
Unlike the growth rates, the structure of exports shows a 
tendency to steady change which'is one of :the most noteworthy 
features of foreign trade. 
During the fiVè-year period 1970-1975 there was considerable 
diversification of exports in the direction of the introduction of ; 
new agricultural products, a higher degree of processing of basic 
commodities, and/or a growing proportion of manufactured goods, 
depending on the countries concerned. 
Agricultural exports became more diversified in most countries, 
especially Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. The 
countries also implemented policies designed to increase the degree 
of processing of their products. As a result, there was a reduction 
in the percentage of agricultural exports with a low degree of 
processing and an increase in the share of many branches of the 
foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco industry. Thus, for example, in 
the three countries with the biggest economies and populations the 
proportion of exports accounted for by low-processed agricultural 
/products fell 
products fell from about 50 per cent to 33 per cent, this.reduction 
being largely made .up' for. by iiicrfeased exports- of semi—processed or 
processed agricultural products.;: : • . . 
A similar tendency -to that; of agricultural products was observed 
in the mining sector« Thus¿ for example, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Bolivia all raised the degree of processing of their mining and 
petroleum products. * : 
The incorporation of petroleum among the exports of Ecuador 
and Bolivia appreciably changed the structure of their exports. Thus, 
in the case of Ecuador,- agricultural exports, fell from 90 per cent 
of the total in 1970 to 50 per cent in 1973* while Bolivia's petroleum 
exports rose to about 20 per:cent of the country's total sales abroad 
in 1973. . j 
The proportion of manufactured goods in the list of exports 
rose very rapidly and covered both intermediate goqds and products 
of the metal manufactures and machinery seotor. The region managed 
to export goods with quite, high levels of sophistication.and technology, 
and in 1973» for example, most of these goods were sold to- developed 
countries, thus giving an indication of the potential market that 
exists for this type of exports. Naturally, it was the bigger 
countries - which;are also those having the highest degree of ; 
industrialization - wjhich exported the major part of the regional 
total. Intra-regional trade in these goods also increased, but 
without attaining growth rates comparable t.o those ach-ieved> in trade 
with the developed countries., .*• 
The participation of the transnational enterprises, the 
prevailing: international situation and the export promotion policies 
pursued are.the factors which had a decisive influence on the results 
obtained in the diversification of exports of manufactures. As a 
result of these factors, the annual growth rate of exports of 





During the five-year period 1971*?1975, :taking* the region as a -: 
whole, imports showed a definite tendency to grow much more rapidly 
than the product, except in 1975« .In-the course of the first four 
.yearsj.the annual growth rate rose from 5 per cent in 1971 to 
19.4 per cent in 1974. When the countries are taken individually, 
however, the figures for 1975 reveal different situations, especially 
for thé oil-exporting countries. . 
• In the first four yeârs ( 1971^-1974) imports showed an upward 
trend for most of thé countries.! In the first three years,, and 
especially in the two-year period 1972-1973, this upward trend 
accompanied the rapid expansion in the purchasing power of exports. 
From 1974 onwards, however, a difference began to show itself between 
the trend in the oil-exporting countries and that in the non-oil-
exporting nations. In 1974, when the purchasing powèr.of.the exports 
of many of the non-oil-exporting.countries declined, the imports of 
those countries showed a strong,resistance to falling;, on the-contrary, 
imports continued to increase their growth rate in some countries. 
Thus, Argentina, Brazil and. Mexico recorded rates close to or 
exceeding 20 pèr cent in 1974, whereas other non-oil-exporting.;; 
countries ¡already showed lower rates of growth of imports in that 
year:. Chile's growth.rate fell to 1.5 per cent, while Guatemala and 
Uruguay recorded negative growth rates. 
The oil-exporting countries had the highest rates of growth 
of the period in 1974, with both Bolivia-and Ecuador recording 
rates close to 30 per cent. . 
As a consequence of the trends noted in the period 1971-1974, 
the Coefficients of imports as a percentage, of the product increased 
in most countries and rose, for the region as a whole, from •-.••'. 
11.6 per cent in 1970 to 13»6 per cent in 1974. 
In 1975 the situation .changed drastically for the non-o'il-
exporting countries. Most of them reduced their imports, and apart 
from the oil-exporting countries only Peru and Guyana registered 
high rates' of increase. 
/Analysis of 
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Analysis of the structure of imports reveals important differences 
between the Latin American countries,^/ largely because of the differing 
internal productive structure,.of. the countries. 
Thus, the countries which display a high degree of agricultural 
self-sufficiency and have made substantial progress in industrialization 
are notable for the low .proportion Qf consumer goods in their imports. 
This is so in the case of such countries as Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico. ....... 
The degree of endowment with energy resources is another of the 
internal variables which influences the structure of the value of 
imports. The countries where energy requirements have accounted for 
a major share of the value of imports in the last fifteen years are 
Brazil, .Panamaf and Uruguay,, where they have consistently amounted 
to over 15 per cent of the total. 
Generally speaking, raw.materials and capital, goods have made 
up the biggest proportion^.of imports. The relation between the 
percentages for these , two items reflect the balance between the 
different branches.of industry. Thus, for example, Argentina is 
more advanced in the field of metal manufactures and machinery than 
in. that pf basic industrial inputs, and the latter account for over 
55 per cent.of its imports. For most of the countries,...intermediate 
goods represent the biggest item in their imports. 
Th^.five-year,period 1971-1975.did not show any great changes, 
in these trends. If .the per9entages are based on figures expressed 
in dollars,at current prices, however, it is seen that the price 
changes which took place from 1973 onwards, and especially the rises 
in fuel prices., significantly.altered the proportions. Thus, the 
countr̂ .ê „ which are not self-sufficient in petroleum had to increase 
very significantly the proportion of their spending accounted fpr 
by fuel.purchases. In 197^, ten countries spent over 15 per cent of 
the total value of theirimports on §uch purchases, the extreme 
cases being.those of Panama, Uruguay,.Paraguay and Brazil, which 
spent 35». 33»,25 and Zk per cent of their imports on this item. 
3/ See "Indicators of Economic and Social Development in Latin 
America, 1976", E/CEPAL/1021, International Trade, p. 8l, 
tables B.l to B.4. 
/(c) The 
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(c) The terme of trade 
The terms of trade bf Latin America have varied considerably : 
during this five-year period, as is showh'-by the indices in table 11-14 
There is a sharp contrast between the position-of the oil-exporting 
countries and that of the other countries;^ 
Taking 1970 as base year, it mày be'Seen that the terms of 
trade of the oil-exporting countries improved steadily until 1974, 
when the index reached a level of approximately 330 as a result 
ofthe rise in fuel prices, which was higher than the 
increase in the unit values of their itapiorts. In 1975, however, the 
index dropped to 259 bëcause of the constant rise in the prices of 
their imports. •'•''" 
Notwithstanding the methodological and conceptual problems 
which surround the meaning and measuré of such indices 
in the analysis of long-term developments, far from the 
base year, it is interesting to noté that thé oil-
exporting countries had been suffering from à constant 
worsening of their térms Of trade since the beginning of the 
1950s. • • •  - • 
Because of the size Of its exports and imports, Venezuela has 
a preponderant influence in this group of Latin American countries. 
The other two, Bolivia khd Ecuador, atfe relatively small and have a 
different structure of1 foreign trade from-' Venezuela' s, and'therefore 
the evolution of their own"indices is not the same as that of 
Venezuela; although in the last two years they too follow the rising 
and falling trend mentioned above. 
Naturally, the change in the terms of trade has been Very 
different for the non-oil-exporting countries. The aggregate index 
for this g^oup of countries, still with 1970'as the base yëàr, fell 
in 1971 but generally recovered in 1972, to reach a peak in 1973, 
primarily as a result of the higher growth of the prices of basic ' 
exports. However, the index only reached 107 in that year. 
In 1974 the higher prices of petroleum, industrial products and 
other goods imported by these countries led to a deterioration which 
/grew worse 
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:vrhich grew worses in. 1975rtoith'ftJieV'Stieady' •Tisevitx1 the prices of; 
3 , industrial, imports. ;. Th.j.s: worsening'was sucSh'- that in 1975 the terms 
of trade of the nOn-oil-exporting icountïrieŝ  were 8 per cent-below 
the 1970 level.,. ; 
This downward trend, was- generalized throughout the countries 
of the group, and,particularly strong in Chile and Uruguay where 
the index fell to 60 in 1975» Costa Rica, • Chile, Guatemala and 
Haiti were below, the 1970. level throughout this five-ryear period. 
Finally, it is significant that the peak level in 1973-is : 
./considerably below the:average level of the early 1950s. 
Cd) Balance . of. payments.-. • v i"! 
For obvioùs/reasons, in the'-analysis of1 the balance-of-
pâyments situation a sharp distinction must be drawn between the 
oil-éîcporting and. the" non-oil-expOrting countries. 
. Throughout the fivè*y@ar; period the noh-bilr-ekp'Orting countries 
had, increasingly large trade deficits/ risihg-'frbm-Mo millioft'- dollars 
in 1970(to 11 billion in'1975.' All the countries had deficits with 
the sole exception of Argèntina, which on average had a surplus in 
the period. B r a z i l M e x i c o weffe responsible 'for-' à-1%'rge proportion 
of the deficit, betweenthem;accounting for fever 7'billion dollars 
in 1975 (71 per cent of the total)'; Among- the medium^'sized countries, 
Colombia managed to attain a tradeiequilibrium in thé last three 
years. (See table 11-1$..•) , 1 •. • • , ' • j • 
This trade deficit was influèneed by the' sharp rise in the 
volume of imports, and the higher prices of imports of manufactures 
and . oil. These factors grew stronger over the last two years,": 
causing the deficit: to "rise from.-an average Of nearly 1/500 million 
:. dollars over the threeryear period-1971-1975,•' to. an averagë lêvel 
•of 10.billion dollars in the two-year period 1974-1975. '' ̂  f-
The oil-exporting countries followed opposite trends, ' 
particularly dtìr̂ ng the last two.years, Venezuela, which fias the 
greatest weight in the figures for.those countries, had a^permànent 
trade surplus (see table 1X̂ 15).. • Thè remaining ! countries had a 
/deficit for 
deficit for; thè' three years 1971̂ -1973̂ ' like .the non-oil-exporting 
countries, but a surplus in the last.two years. For these countries 
as- a whole, r 1974 was-» outstanding since thei surplus was extremely 
high at 11,400 million dollars. In 1975, as a result of production 
cuts and larger volumes of imports at higher prices, there was a 
marked fall in their-trade surplus. .Venezuela's surplus fell from 
10.7 billion to 5 billion dollars» 
The region as a whole had a deficit oh current account 
throughout the five-year period. . : : . 
In the.non-òil*exporting countries this deficit was very high 
because of the sharp rise in the trade deficit arid net payments of 
profits and interest. The;latter rose considerably over the last 
two years, reaching roughly.5,700 million dollars in 1975» With, 
regard to net factor payments, Mexico's position is noteworthy: 
after Venezuela, it had the highest;level of remittances. Thus the 
current account deficit was,, increasingly large j." particularly in the 
last two. years. In 1975 it was over 16 billion dollars, four times 
higher , than the average for. 1971-1973* The ratio of. the current; 
account deficit- to the value of exports. Of goods and services rose 
from 20 per cent in 1970 to 54 per cent in 1975. 1973 was the' 
most favourable year : in . the period: for this group of countries : 
thanks to the rise in the"volume of exports and the improvement 
in the terms of trade, the ratio dropped to 18.5 per cent. 
. The oil-exporting countries had a slight deficit on current 
account, in the two-year period 1971-1972, which, thereafter became 
a large surplus. Until 19!74 net payments of profits and interest 
grew, steeply, as in the case of the non-oilrexporting countries. 
In 1975» however, there was a sharps drop in this heading in Venezuela, 
from 4,300 million dollars in .̂974 to 1,800 million dollars. 'This 
was partly due to the fact that Venezuela had been exporting capital 
since.,1973; and therefore its current account surplus shrank less 
than the trade,surplus mentioned 'above. In sum, its surplus fell 
from 6 billion dollars in 1974 to.3<billion in 1975. For the 
/countries of 
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countries of'this'group as a wihol'é, the surplus in 197^ represented 
37 per cent of their exports,'ànd 21 per cent in 1975« 
(e) External financing and indebtedness': 
The net external financing* obtained by Latin America in the 
first half of the 1970s was concentrated in-the non-oil-exporting 
countries: from 1973 onwards the'oil-exporting countries became 
exporters of capital. (See table 11-15. ) '"• 
In the threé-year period 1971-1973 the non-roil-exportihg 
countries had an inflow of non-cbtjipensatory capital which exceeded 
their current account deficit,' so'that they'were able to build up 
monetary' reserves. It éhould bé noted that in many cases this 
building up-of reserves reflected deliberate•government policy 
designed to-guard against unfavourable extèrnal situations such as 
occurred in the last two years. 
The situation of these countries changed in 197^-1975» when 
they had to have recourse to their reserves in order to finance part 
of their.Current account deficit. There'cân be no doubt that Brazil 
was the country which followed the-reserve policy most intensely, 
and this had the" effect of absorbing''some of the severity 
of the fluctuations in its external trade. 
During the period under consideration the movement of capital 
underwent considerable changes. Private sourceê came to'predominate 
over national or multinational official sources, most of the ' ' 
financing coming from foreign private banks with a small proportion 
provided through suppliers' credits and direct foreign investment. 
Concessional loans to countries of the region were very 
scarce. Thus, the concessional credit extended by the DAC 
(Development Aid Committee) came to only 626 million dollars in 
1974- for the whole of the region. 
The figures for 1975 reveal that of the total financing required 
official spurces provided 14 per cent, loans from private sources 
63 per cent, direct foreign investment H per ccnt and withdrawals 
from reserves 12 p^r cent. Among the private loanSf those from banks 
far exceeded the remainder, Thus, for example, they were pver seven 
/times greater 
- to -
times greater than suppliers' credits, which were the next biggest 
item under this heading. It is estimated that at the end of 1975 
the guaranteed and noni-guarhnteed debt with the foreign banks of 
11 developed countries came to 4-3.5 billion dollars out of an estimated 
total indebtedness of about 67 billion dollars. (See table II-16.) 
Of this total external indebtedness, Brazil and Mexico h&tfe 
absorbed an average of around 75 per cent of the total debts to 
banks. This explains much of the increase in net external factor 
payments recorded by these countries. 
The change in the structure of the external debt is having 
unfavourable repercussions on the financial costs, terms and interes 
rates of such indebtedness. Thus, the servicing of the external 
debt represented about 28 per cent of the value of the'region's 
exports in 1975, and it is estimated that this figure will rise to 
30 per cent in 1976. 
The situation in the oil-exporting countries is different, 
especially in the case of Venezuela. From 1973 onwards, in spite of 
reducing its exports of crude, this country was able to become an 
exporter of capital, to increase its, monetary reserves, and to 
raise considerably the growth rate of its imports. 
The other oil-exporting countries did not do quite so well, 
sinoe in 1975 they had a small current account deficit; nevertheless 




3« Agricultural production 
. The most prominent feature of the period '1970-JL9.75 i® the 
unevenness of the, results of tfie successive harvests. The ,annual 
changes in, the physical volume of regional, production. Ixave been very 
marked. The. average .growth rate of the period is some.- 2.5),per cent a 
year, bj: and it covers rates ranging from a modest 0.5,per cent in 1972 
- the worst agricultural year for.; a long time in Latin..America because 
of adverse climactic conditions to a noteworthy ,6.2, per cent 
recorded in 197^, influenced; by the favourable prospects of the 
international markets. .•/•;... • { 
The growth rate of production has been declining over the. past 
two decades, from 3.7 per cent in the 1950s to 3.2 per cent in the 1960s. 
Moreover this trend is found in. a-great many of the countries of the 
region (see table 11-17). Jt would appear that a major qualitative 
change has occurred in various* countries "¡-.with the exception of Brazil 
and Paraguay - where the process :©f the growth of agriculture through 
the extension of the; area..used for crops and livestock* has come to a 
standstill. The annual. ~iHorea§§# of production, have: .progressively had 
to be maintained by raiding: thp unit yields - through the .application 
of technology and investment « and this has been a slow process. 
Moreover , the., production destined mainly to, the dpmestic ..markets 
has shown greater dynamism than the-traditional export, products. 
Only tv/o countries,T Nicaragua .and Venezuela,, attained the: goal 
of k p e r cent set by the IDS, and both have only a small share of the 
regioral production» , 
Brazil, Colombia and some small countries benefited from dynamic 
external demand and their growth-rates ranged from 3 to 4 per cent a 
year. In Chile and Uruguay, howe-ver, agricultural productipn was . 
stationary or pn the decline. . . 
hj The national accounts statistics which include the value added 
at constant' prices show a somewhat more favourable evolution, 




It should be noted that the rates of incorporation of new land 
during the five year period did,not match those of the previous decade. 
The harvested area increased by 1.9 per cent a year compared with 
an annual rate of '2.2'per cent in the previous decade. If Brazil, 
the country which incorporated the most new land into production, is 
excluded,"the annual rate increased at only 0.6 per cent a year. Thus wit 
the exception of Brazil and Paraguay the growth rate of agricultural 
production largely'depended on increases in the product per hectare. 
The nutritional situation of Latin America, although less critical 
than that of other developing regions, is far from comparable with that 
of the more developed countries, except in the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay. 
During the period under consideration there was a slight 
improvement in the average supply of' alimentary energy, which rose 
from 2,450 calories a day per inhabitant in 1961/1963 to 2,650 units 
in 1971/1974, in relation to an estimated minimum requirement of 
2,400 calories» This global figure Combines the increase recorded in the 
largest countries with the persistence of an unsatisfactory situation in 
various countries arid the unchanged state of these indicators in others. 
The average national levels, which in most of the countries are' higher 
than the minimum needs, conceal the marked inequality in the distributior 
of food among the population. It is estimated that 50 per cent of the 
Latin American population has access to only 2,250 "calories per day 
or less. •; 
The slow growth of agricultural production has had adverse 
repercussions on the region's exporting position and has weakened its 
capacity of agricultural self-sufficiency. This can be seen by 
observing both the evolution of world trade and the groivth rate of the 
region's exports in past decades. While world agricultural exports 
increased in volume by about 3.7 per cent a year between 1971 and 1974, 
those of Latin America rose by only 1 per cent a year, so that tĥ -
region's share in the international agricultural market has continued 
to decline, falling from 17 per cent in 1950 to some 13 per cent in 
/1974, with 
197^» with sharp decreases in some of its most important products 
such as coffee, cocoa and wheat:and, to a lesser extent, bananas 
and-sugar. ' The marked increase, in exports of soya beans, is the main 
exception.: ; .; 
The situation is even.'more serious considering that the growth 
rate;of exports of basic agricultural products frorn the region has 
been declining over the last 25 years. It amounted to 3.2 per cent 
a year in the 1950s, fell to a rate of 2.6 per cent a year in the 
1960s and to only 1 per cent during the period 1971 to 1974. The 
region has been hit particularly hard by the adverse effects of 
restrictions on the access of its products to the main consumer 
markets because of various protectionist measures and policies of 
the developed countries, in particular the barring of the region from 
the meat market of the EEC, exports at subsidized prices of products 
competing with regional production and preferential treatment in 
favour of other regions. However tl̂ e decline in the growth of exports 
also reflects the inadequate capacity of domestic production which, 
as has been seen, has not been able to respond adequately to the 
increasing demand of its own market. 
Furtheremore, during this period, and despite the diversification 
in some cases, the high degree of concentration of exports in a small 
number of products and the fyeavy dependence on a few markets (United 
States and Europe) has continued. Towards 1972/1974 the 6 main 
products constituted 82 per cent of total exports and 65 per cent 
were made up of sugar, coffee and meat. Around 1970 60 per cent of 
Latin American agricultural exports went to the United States and EEC 
countries, 17 per cent to other developed countries, 14 per cent 
to other developing areas and the socialist countries and the remaining 
9 per cent constituted the intra-pegional trade; the last percentage 
was almost the same as in 1950. 
The inadequacy of domestic supply explains the increasing 
significance of agricultural imports from outside the region, mainly 
food. The slow growth of exports contrasts with the rapid increase in 
regional imports. These expanded by 6 per cent a year during the 1960s 
/and in 
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and in the first half of the current decade the average annual, increase 
was more, than 10 per c e n t o The increasing dependence on imports is 
particularly, marked in the case,of a few "critical" products such as 
wheat, edible oils and dairy products which currently represent over 
60 per cent of the total imported and are provided by a few supplier 
countries, particularly the United States and other developed countries. 
The 
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4. The manufacturing industry 
The growth,.rate of manufacturing production intensified during the 
period 1971 to 1974 and the .region attained the goal of 8 per cent 
proposed.in the IDS» In 1975 there was a sharp loss of momentum and 
the rate of increase fell to 1.5 per cent., although it should be noted 
that this decline did not affect the petroleum-exporting countries 
which,- on the contrary attained higher rates than in previous years. 
If the five year period is considered as a whole it can be seen 
that only four countries exceeded the rate of 8 per cent. Of those, 
two are. petroleum-exporting countries (Venezuela and Ecuador); the 
other two, Brazil and the Dominican Republic, had rates of over 10 per 
cent. At the other^extreme there, are two.countries (Uruguay and Panama) 
with rates near or-lower than 2 per cent and Chile, which recorded a 
negative average rate over the period. (See table IIt-l8'„) 
The situation'̂  of Latin America in the context of world industrial 
production has barely changed over.the last 10 years, its low relative 
position of around 3*4 per cent of that total having persisted» sp that 
the industrialization effort carried out during this peri.9d was not 
sufficient to alter this situation. Expressed in per capita terms the 
gap has increased considerably, since the population of Latin America 
reached 8.2 per cent of the world total in 1975 despite the,fact that 
the perycapita manufacturing product grew at J.9 per cent a year 
between 1970-1975, rising from 138 dollars to 167 dollars, at 1970... pricef 
over that period,. 
The contribution of the manufacturing industry to the gross-,, 
domestic product continued to increase during this period. In 1975 it 
represented almost 24 per cent of the total for the region as a whole. 
In 1950 this share was 18 per cent, and in i960 it reached 20 per cent 
and in 1970 it was 23 per cent. It is thus evident that there is a 
rising trend and that the industry continues to gain in importance as a 
factor in the economic development of the region. 
/At the 
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At the same time, however, the disparity in the degree of the 
.industrialization process in different countries has increased, as 
can be. seen in table II-4. While the share of industry in the product 
of the three largest countries continued to rise during this period 
it remained virtually unchanged in most of the other countries. 
.- Along with this process there has been an accentuation of a major 
change in the relative importance of the countries of the region as a 
result of the unequal industrial growth recorded in them during the 
post-war period. The industrial production of Brazil and Mexico 
represented 4j per cent,of the regional total in 1950 and this share 
rose to,5^ per cent in 1970 and to nearly 60 per cent in 1975» 
However the countries of,the southern cone (Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay), which had advanced rapidly in the.industrialization process, 
experienced a decline in their regional share from 42 per cent in 1950 
to 30 per cent in 1970.and 24 per cent in 1975 (see table 11-19). 
During the period 1970 to 1975 the policies.for the encouragement 
and promotion of non-traditional exports which had been adopted from 
the middle of the previous decade onwards became more intensive and 
more widespread. The goals of these policies benefited in recent 
years from the international situation which created favourable 
conditions for the.export of industrial products. 
In these circumstances the exports of industrial products grew 
between 197° and 1974 at an annual rate, of around 20 per. cent a year. 
In 1975» despite the decline in external demand, they again increased 
at around 5 per cent. 
The exports of industrial goods from Latin America to the 
developed countries showed great:dynamism during the period. Thus 
in.1973 some 60 per cent were destined to those countries. Latin 
America was also a dynamic and attractive market, but it did not 
succeed in absorbing,exports at rates, similar to. those of the developed 
countries. As a result its share as an importing country fell from . 
36 per cent in 1968 to 27 per cent in 1973» 
/The rise 
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The rise in exports also involved a diversification, covering 
categories of intermediate' products and capital goods of which sales 
abroad had been very limited or practically non-existent at the end 
of-the previous decade« . The three -largest countries which also have the 
highest degree of industrialization were the main exporters of 
manufactured products, accounting for around 75 per cent of the 
regional total» 
These advances are of particular significance for the external 
sector of Latin America since they involve an increasing diversification 
of,exports. In 1970 industrial, products represented.15 per cent of the 
total value of .the region's exports ,and in 1975. this, proportion rose to 
some 25: per .cent <i The-growth, of industrial exports was not unrelated 
to the inflationary, process in ,,the industrialized countries.. The rise 
in .prices, and at; times., the prolonged delivery periods of various types 
of industrial goods in these countries improved the,competitive position 
of those Latin American countries which.were able to,provide such goods. 
By . means-of adequate promotional activities they.»were able to export 
significant quantities^ opening out markets which, in some cases, they 
continued-to, consolidate.. ;.-•:-
, The importance,-. -off. (exte.rnal., resources in the_ financing of industry 
increased, especially in the period 1972 to. 19.73.1. -in the. form of credits 
from suppliers and loans, from private banks, although t.he, conditions 
and terms became more. restrictive after 197i+<) Direct private investment 
also increased. The. flow-.of investment, from the United States reached 
a total of 566 million dollars in 1972, which was double the, 1970 figure, 
although it should be noted that a high proportion of this investment 
(around 65 per cent) represents a reinvestment of profits. 
The access of the individual Latin American countries to the 
sources of financing for industry and other activities varies greatly. 
Some of the countries have set up financial institutions and mechanisms, 
and also developed'international relations which, together: .with the 
dynamism of their economies and t|ae stability of their policies, made it 
easier for then} to secure very high, proportions of financing ..and direct 
foreign investment. To all this should be added the increasing importanc 
of the transnational corporations in the production and exports of the 
manufacturing sector and in the use of these external resources. 
/5. Energy: 
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: -*_'. 5« Energy; situation .#nd supplies . , . 
The drastic' rise'" in 'o'il'- prices'- "iif-: Xtypy-lV*?1* clearly revealed 
the differing positions of the 'Latin-American countries with* regard 
to the degree of domestic supply for' their'energy consumption, it-
led to a review of, and particular côncërh for, energy policy which-
is resulting in an attempt to raise the level of self-sufficiency in 
exiergy and bring down" the' growth rates";'bf -energy consumption!. 
The use of petroleum as the main source of energy had become 
widespread in all the countries of the region.1" Iri -recent years almost 
80 per cent of consumption'requirements of modern energy 5/1 were met 
by petroleum and natural gas., ;0n thej Other hand, the countries * shares 
in oil production, far from converging, tended-to grow increasingly 
different, with production1 becoming clearly concentrated in-a small 
group of countries. 'r:':' ' - •••• 1 
Looking at the total supply'of molièrn ehergy, it may be seen 
that only seven countries 6/ pfrodiiced four out Of thë' five resources 
it comprises.?/ however, 94 per cent of total-energy Consumption was 
met by petroleum and natural gas. Of those 'countries,0 only Venezuela 
is completely self-sufficient in the consumption of petroleum products, 
while Argentina, -'Colombia ''and fiejcic'o are close to sel'f#éuffi'̂ lënciy.'' 
It is suppoâed that With "the new finds 8/ Argentina will1 shortly v: -.: T 
become at least sélf-suffidient, while Héx'ico will once again become 
an'exporter. 'Likewise the prospects for Peru, which ih 1973 produced 
two-thirds of its consumption of petroleum products, suggest that it 
may soon even become an exporter. " '; ,i>" -'" ' '•"' 
2/ Coal,' petroleum, natural gas, hydroelectricity and" nuclear 
-, energy. Does not- include vegetable fuels. ••',... 
6/ Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, M e x i c o a n d Venezuela. 
2/ Until 'I974 Argentina alone possessed a nuclear, power station, 
the small Atucha plant. 
8/ In Argentina in Puerto Rojas, in Mexico in Çhâpas-Tabasco, and 
: in TPeru in the La Concordia fields.' 
/Apart from 
». k9 -
•''•• Apart from Bolivia,. Ecuador and Trinidad and. Tobago, which have 
«. no supply problems, the .other oil-producing countries« Chile, Cuba and 
Brazil, are heavily dependent on imports of crude* .especially Cuba which 
only-.produces .about-Jiper. cent of its consumption, as against 25 per 
cent;in: Brazil and- 30 per cent in Chile» . 
As for; the 13 countries which do not produce petroleum, ;their 
situation is serious because they lack other .significant energy , 
resources, and over:80 per cent,of their supply of modern.enèrgy is 
. based on petroleum-alone» : 
In sum, although the region ias a whole is .̂.n,et exporter of 
petroleum, the supply situation varies greatly from,., country to country. 
Taking the region as a-whole,, it: mâ . be jseen,.that. in 19.7.3. tons of 
crude were produced for?every, ton of. petroleum, products-consumed; but 
in the group of deficit countries this; ratio was only 0,25.. .. 
Over the last 25 years this ratio fell, for the region as a whole, 
from 3„9 tons in 195° tp-2,,3.-tons in 1973»; . This drop maytlargely ,b.e 
explained by., the low level of c prospect ion activity »9/ . According, to 
estimates, total prospection expenditure in 1973 was more,or less, the 
same as in I960, in current dollars, probably because it was expected 
that cheap imported petroleum would continue to be...available* It is 
worth mentioning that, apart from Trinidad and - Tobago and Venezuela, 
the other oil-producing countries only increased their domestic 
production by 82 per cent in 1960-1970 while.at the.same time their 
imports of crude rose by 100 per cent-
However, the new structure of fuel prices and the higher crude 
prices from 1973, have reversed these trends. Thus prospection 
investment in the region increased from 100 million dollars in 1975 to 
180 million in 197^ and production investment from 775 to 1,215 million 
dollars.10/ 
9/ The number, of wells drilled per square mile in Latin America 
(0.02) represents 2 per cent of the United States figure and 
13 per cent of the same figure for the Soviet Union. 
10/ See Chase Manhattan Bank, Energy Economics Division. 
/The problems 
- * 
The problems caused by the absence or low level of oil production 
in mainy countries raiëèd the need for a review of the role which energy 
resources should play in regional development; especially bearing in 
miiid that the same Consideration in a few countries occurs in reserves 
as in the field of production. It is estimated that 90 per cent of 
reserves of petroleum and ria,tural gas are located in only 5 countries, 
most .particularly Venezuela, 
The proven•oil reserves of Latin America at the beginning of 
1976 represented a volume equivalent to 22 times 1975 production, while 
natural gas reserves represented 64 times the 1975 production level. 
Using a7 more flexible concept of reserves of oil', such as expanded 
proven reserves, this:quantity could be four times greater.'' 
In addition, identified coal -reserves-are<estimated at 20 billion 
tons, which is one thousand times recent annual .consumption. 
Over the last five years the évolution of modern energy consumption 
Continués to show downward product-elasticity trend already observed 
in earlier periods, mirroring the experience of the more developed 
countries o r regions, The elasticity of energy consumption with 
respect to the product has a tendency to fall, but in Latin America 
this has been very marked in the 1970s, particularly following the^ 
risè in1oil prices. This elasticityy for the region a s a whole, fell 
from 1.2 in the period 1960-1970 to-1^04 in 1970-1974, which implies 
some relief for the deficit countries of; the region. 
/III. MEDIUM-TERM 
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-"••••" III. MEDIUM-TERM ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND 
PROJECTIONS, 1976-1980 
1. The balance-of-payments problems and the rate 
of economic growth 
The study in chapter II.of the evolution of the balance of 
payments and the economic, growth rate of the non-oil-exporting 
countries could be taken to refer essentially to the group of 
11 countries which account for 84 per cent of the product and 
8l per cent of the population of Latin America. The basic data 
on the more important economic variables appears in table III-l. 
The group, of course, is not homogeneous: it includes 
large, medium and small countries, whose individual situations and 
performances need not be similar. Nevertheless, the conclusions 
drawn from the study of the aggregate variables of this group of 
countries may be considered to be of general application. These 
conclusions may fundamentally be summarized as follows: 
. „ (a) In the period 1970-1974 the rate of economic growth 
accelerated, reaching an annual rate of about 7«5 per cent, and the 
economy developed with a relatively open structure with respect to 
external variables. In the two-year period 1972-1973» exports 
were particularly vigorous and grew, in physical terms, faster than 
the domestic product, with increasing diversification in branches 
of commodities, while sales of industrial products rose considerably. 
These countries demonstrated, although to a markedly different degree, 
their capacity to,produce and export in order to take advantage of 
the favourable conditions of the international market stemming from 
the boom in the industrial countries and the higher commodity prices; 
(b) The volume.of imports grew even more than that of exports, 
at twice: the rate of the domestic product, as a result of the growth 
of demand due to the. rise in real income and in requirements of 
intermediate products and capital goods to supply the productive 
activities and the investment process. Until 1973 the pressure of 




(c) Net payments of interest and profits : in respect of external 
investment and indebtedness gradually increased, but the deficit on 
current account remained at about 3,600 million dollars* until 1973« 
These deficits- were financed with an ample inflow of capital largely 
obtained from foreign private and banking sources, which also helped 
to swell monetary reserves. Naturally, the large countries, particularly 
Brazil and Mexico, had the greatest share in the process; 
(d) In the context of these developments, one important factor 
was that until 1973 external indebtedness and services, although 
already at a high level in absolute terms, bore some relation to the 
simultaneous rise in export earnings. This is a key relationship in 
the operation of the model characterized by the aggregate variables 
of this ,group of countries; 
(e) In 19?b the effects and repercussions of the recession which 
was beginning to spread in the industrial countries and the sharp 
worsening of the terms of trade, brought about by inflation in the 
industrial countries and the higher prices of oil and some primary 
products, were instrumental in creating an external, bottleneck which 
had to come to a head in the following year. There was a considerable 
fall in the growth rate of the volume of exports, although their 
current value continued to rise because of higher prices; however, 
the value of imports rose much more, due to the above-mentioned 
factors and because the Governments still did not adopt restrictive 
policies. In these circumstances, the rate of growth of the product 
was maintained while the current account deficit rose from'the 
3.6 billion dollars of previous years to over 11 billion in 197^. 
(f) In 1975 the terms of trade again deteriorated, the volume 
of exports dropped and the Governments began to adopt measures to 
control the growth of domestic demand, particularly for imports. 
There was a drastic fall in the economic growth rate and the deficit 
on current account now stood at lV billion dollars; 
/(g) As 
(g).A's a consequence of these deficits, external indebtedness 
increased, its terms became harder and costs-heavier, which led to 
very heavy commitments for amortization and interest payments in the 
coming yearsj 
(h) The breakdown of this model of economic growth and external 
indebtedness is clearly apparent in the fact that ivhile until 1973 
the ratio between the current account deficit and the value of exports 
declined, in 1974-1975 it increased considerably. In 1973 the ratio 
was 17«5 per cent and in 1975 it reached 51«9 per cent. 
The consequences of a process of this kind are evident. In the 
first place, current export earnings will be seriously undermined by 
external debt servicing, and a large inflow of financing will be 
necessary to ensure"specific levels of imports, not to mention that 
- in many cases foreign exchange reserves will have to be built up. 
In addition, these heavy external commitments may hinder the flow of 
external financing as well as the solution of the balance-of-payments 
problem,"even if imports decrease and.the economic growth rate is 
slow, which will dangerously aggravate the social, tensions looming; 
over Latin America'. : > • .» .- , 
It should therefore be asked in what conditions;the non-oil-
exporting countries can recover their economic dynamism and continue 
to be relatively open towards the exterior, still following the general 
lines of their development since the end of the 1960s; as well as 
what kind of changes should be made in the short term to tackle the 
balance-of-payments problems while at the same time maintaining a 
specific rate of economic growth. In order to study these questions 
and illustrate the alternative or complementary solutions which might 
be considered in very general terms, a set of projections has been 
prepared for each of the 11 countries, whose general features are 
described below. These should by no means be construed to be 
predictions or forecasts. 
/2. Two 
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2„ Two exercises in macroreconomic projections by country 
' 1 ' for the period 1976-1980 
(a)- Some methodological questions and hypotheses used 
For each of the countries, growth targets were established for 
the gross domestic product according to two scenarios. Scenario A 
is based on the recovery of the growth rate in a shorter period, 
leading to an average rate for the countries as a whole of a little 
over 6 per cent in the period 1976-1980. Scenario B considers the 
possibility that the rate of growth will remain low until 1977 and 
then pick up, so that the average for the period is a little under 
6 per cent. This second scenario takes account to some extent both 
of the suggestions in some countries of slow growth in the present 
year and also of the possible effects of restrictive measures which 
are being stepped up in .other countries. 
The projection of exports is based on a study of the trends 
in the different types of product, including in some cases the 
countries' known export programmes. It assumes that the growth rate 
of the industrial countries will recover. For the group of 11 non-oil-
exporting countries it gives an annual growth rate of about 8 per cent, 
which" is higher than the past trend in those countries. This implies 
that exports of commodities and products with some degree of, 
transformation will grow at a higher rate than in. the past, and that 
exports of industrial products will grow by between 10 and 15 per cent 
according to the country, i.e., leiss than in previous years. 
The projections on the evolution of import and export prices 
were prepared using, from 1975 on, the prospective trends which 
appear in the World Bank surveys of Latin American countries* The 
result is a projection of the terms of trade which remains relatively 
stable and improves to some extent towards the end of the decade. 
Throughout the five-year period, however, the level of the index is 
clearly below the 1970 level. 
Imports were projected using econometric functions for each of 
the countries under consideration. In these fuctions import 
/requirements of 
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requirements of intermediate products and consumer gopds depend on. 
the domestic product, and capital goods requirements on fixed investment« 
In addition, adjustments were made to take into account, as far as 
possible, the substitution effects of the proposed or ongoing 
industrialization programmes.particularly in the case of important 
intermediate products and capital goods, in Brazil and Mexico. 
These projections indicate that the ratio of imports to the gross 
domestic product will fall over the next few years for the countries 
as a whole. Excluding 197^» when imports were exceptionally high, the 
ratio will drop from an average of 10.6 to 9-6 in the next five years. 
This reduction may be considered feasible* in virtue of the 
industrialization programmes mentioned earlier and also because it will 
be possible to control or hold down certain important types of products, 
which had grown in recent years, without affecting the economic dynamism 
postulated in the projections. 
Finally, the service of the external debt and investment were 
estimated on the hypothe'sis that additional financing will continue 
to be provided in large part by private sources, as has been the case 
hitherto. 
(b) The results of thè projections 
The results of the projections for each of thè countries were 
added together for the group under consideration and appear in tables 
III-l and III-2. While the situation and"prospects vary from country 
to country, some conclusions of general value may be drawn from these 
aggregate results. The following are the more essential features: 
(1) The trade deficit will decline substantially and disappear 
by 1980, but since payments of interest and profits will continue to 
increase, the deficit on current account will remain at approximately 
the high absolute levels of 1975» At the same time, since the 
amortization of the accumulated debt will tend to increase, the gross 
capital flows needed to finance the balance-of-payments"dèficit and 
amortization payments will have to grow considerably. According to 
the results .of these projections, thè gross capital inflow will rise 
from 15 billion dollars in 197^ to 2? billion in 1980. 
/(2) In 
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(2) In othSr words, despite the relatively high growth rates 
of exports and the smaller import ratio, this group of countries 
will have greater external financing needs, primarily to service 
investment and indebtedness. 
The projections of scenario B (see table III-.2), which assume 
a slightly lower economic growth rate than in scenario A, show a 
smaller trade deficit than in scenario A as a result of lower demand 
for imports. However, it will readily be understood that the results 
concerning the balance-of-payments deficit and external financing 
needs do not change significantly. 
Thus if the projection of exports is' retained, the balance-of-
payments problem for the next five years depends more on the 
commitments entered into for the existing accumulated indebtedness 
than on a change in the economic growth rate, assuming that the 
countries will not wish this growth to fall below specific rates. 
3. Conclusions on the balance-of-payments problems 
of the non-6ii-exporting countries 
The appraisal of the balance-of-payments problems and these 
projections warrant some conclusions, necessarily of a general nature 
because of the degree of abstraction of the analysis in"this and the 
preceding chapter in the interests of simplification. The following 
points should be stressed, inter alia; 
(a). The high-level of external indebtedness already accumulated 
and the. burden of servicing it, which will tend to increase,considerably, 
are in themselves a serious problem because of their effect-on the 
balance of payments and the very risky and vulnerable position in 
which they place the Latin American countries. There is therefore 
a pressing need for international co-operation in finding suitable 
solutions. Various proposals have been made which have not yet 
received the unanimous support of either the developed or the developing 
-countries. CEPAL has also put forward some proposals of a regional 
and international order. In particular, the Latin American countries 
have to obtain greater access to the international financial markets 
, /and change 
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and change -the composition of their financing, increasing credits 
from official sources and reducing the share of private and banking 
sources. 
..(b) As is well known, the rapid rise in export earnings is a 
key variable to manage the balance of payments and (raise the economic 
growth rate. It is clear that the countries should strive to reduce 
their trade deficits as rapidly as possible with a view to reaching an 
equilibrium position. The reasons for this are various: to increase 
external purchasing power, build up suitable foreign exchange reserves 
and reduce the degree of external .vulnerability in order to foster a 
climate of confidence and to facilitate the management of the debt and 
its service.. , r ••• . 1 
The rapid growth of exports over a short period will depend on 
the recovery of the growth rate of the industrial countries and on 
access to their markets; and ultimately, on the adoption of the policies 
and measures proposed by the developing countries on the va?vious aspects 
of trade and prices of commodities and industrial products« There is 
particular concern for the movement of the terms of trade, which 
run the risk of deteriorating still further, either because of the 
steady rise in the prices of imports from the industrial countries or 
because of a fall in the prices of primary products, as is occurring 
in some cases. 
(c) The import ratio will have to be reduced, at least in the short 
term, since the growth of imports must be limited. This may be done 
by restricting or eliminating products which are not essential for 
economic growth or expenditure which cannot be justified, taking into 
account not only the balance-of-payments problems but also the 
prevailing economic and social situation. 
In addition, the countries - particularly the larger ones - have 
established or begun to implement industrial programmes which will 
bring about import substitution in important branches of intermediate 
products and capital goods. 
/(d) This 
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(d) This balarice-of-payments crisis cnce again confirms the 
important role which the growth of intra-regional trade should play 
in the process of Latin American development. It will facilitate a 
more flexible growth structure for the national economies and( tend 
to reduce the heavy dependence which exists today on the central 
countries in the supply of capital goods and basic industrial . 
inputs. 
(e) Finally, it is not out of place to recall that the 
solutions and policies decided on to deal with the balance-of-
payments problems evidently call for complementary measures of an 
internal nature, which must be consistent with the economic and 
social objectives of the national development strategies. 
/TABLES 
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TABLES 

Tabla Int. 1 
UT IN CUBICAS SHARE OP COUNTRIES IN THE REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL AND 
MANUFACTURING GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT«/ 
(Percentages) 
Agricultural Manufacturing 
Country __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
195° i960 1970 1975 1950 i960 1970 1975 
Argentina 19.1 16.6 14.7 13.3 29.7 24.2 21.5 19.3 
Barbados • m m m _ m» m 
Bolivia 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Brazil 23.8 25.8 # . 8 31.7 23.2 30.2 30.5 35.? 
Colombia 9.6 9.2 9.4 10.0 3.? 4.0 3.6 3.8 
Costa Rica 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Cuba - m - • m „ m _ 
C h i l e 3.8 3¿ 3.0 2.4 8.8 7.5 6.6 3.8 
Eouador 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 
£1 Salvador 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Guatemala 2=7 2.5 2.7 3.0 0.9 0.8 0o8 0.8 
Guyana - m» _ m a» _ <m •» 
Haiti U7 1,4 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 
Honduras 3 «3 Ir. 0 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.4 c.3 0.3 
j J a m a l o a - - . m .. .. 
Maxioo 17. "i 18.9 37.2 19.6 1 9 . 4 23*3 23.1 
Nicaragua C.S 0,8 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.3 O.it 0.4 
Panama 0,5 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 8.5 0.4 
Paraguay 1.2 1.0 l . t 1.1 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Peru 5.3 6.0 5.5 4.6 2.6 2.8 3»° 3.1 
Bominioan R e p u b l i c 1.6 2.3 1.7 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 
Trinidad and Tobago - - . m m m 
U r u g u a y 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.1 3.5 2.8 1.7 1.3 
V e s o R u a l a 2.8 3.5 4.1 4.4 2.8 3.9 3.9 4.3 
Latin Amorica iooto 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.8 lOOçO 100.0 
At factor oost In dollars at 1970 prioes, at import exchange rates« 

Table I I - l 








1970" 1971 1972 1973 1974 • 1975 
Annual rates. Deroentages 
Argentina • 4.3 4.3 5.4 • 2.7 4.3 ... . 3.9 6.6 -1.4 
Barbados • • • • • • ... ... ... • • • • • • ... 
Bolivia 5.5 6.4 5.3 3.8 5.4 5.7 6.8 
Brazil 6.0 7.5 9t5 11.3 10.4 11.4 9.6 4.0 
Colombia 5.2 5.8 6.7, 5.8 7.8 7.1 5.9 3.8 
Costa Rloa 6.8 7.0 6.6 £.6 8.8 7.8 4.3 2.6 
Cuba • • • • * • • • • • • • « • • • • • 
Chile 4.5 3.9 3.6 7.7 -0.1 -3.6 4.3 -14.7 
Ecuador 5.3 5.5 '7-9 5.7 7.3 13.1 6.3 8.0 
El Salvador 5*6 4.5 3.0 4.6 5.8 3.9 6.3 3.4 
Guatemala 5-,5 5.8 5.7 5.6 7.4 6,5 5.5 2.2 
Guyana <5 .̂ * '-«a» ' • « « • • • • » • • • v. < • • • ... 
Haiti 1.9 4.8 6.4 3.5 4.'> 4 . 4 3.5 
Honduras k-h 4 , 1 2.6 3.8 3.9 5c 1 0.0 0.0 
Jamaica •c » « M. • * • • • • 4 3« » • • ... 
Mexioo -ft J 6.9 3.4 7.3 '7.6 5.9 3.9 
Nicaragua -3.3 5.8 2.4 3*8 9.2 1.0 
Panama" S.o 7,7 7.0 8.7 6.3 6.5 2.6 3.3 
Paraguay 6.2 4.4 5.1 7.3 8.4 8.0 
Peru 5 . 4 4 , 3 9il 6.5 6.1 5 . 4 6.6 4.0 
Domini can Republic 5.1 • 7,6 I0i6 10.6 12.4 11»3 8.9 6.2 
Trinidad and Tobago • • • • « • • . * » • • • • • • • •0 • • • • • • 
Uruguay 1.5 2.3 4.7 -1.0 -3.4 0.9 1.9' ' 3.6 
Venezuela 5.9 4 . 5 7.2 2.8 3.6 5.8 4.5 6.6 
latin America 5*6 wii i Itl £ ¿ 2 M 2 d z a 
Distribution of oourrtrles • 
aooording to tlia valuo of 
indiigitor 
Number of countries 
Negative m l 2 1 _ 2 
0 to 2.9 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 4 
3.0 to 5.9 12 11 8 9 7 8 8 8 
6.0 and more 5 6 10 7 9 9 8 5 
a/ At market prices. 
Table II-2 
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH HATE OP THE GROSS DOMESTIC INCOME a/ 








i?7o 1971 1972 1973 1971 1975 
Argentina 1.3 1.1 1.9- 3.3 1.9 6.0 6.0 -3.0 
Barbados 1 • 
Bolivia 6*3 6.1 ' 7.5 -0.2 1.3 7.0 18.8 1.1 
Brusii 6.0 7.5 10.0 10.5 11.1 12.2 8.6 3.8 
Colombia 5.2 5.7 8.8 1.5 8.6 9.0 5.6 1.9 
Costa Rica 6»7 6.6 8.6 1.1 •7.8 9.0 1.9 2.8 
Cuba - • ' 
-19.6 Chilo 1.9 1.8 3.7 •1.2 -0.5 -3.0 5.9 
Ecuador 1.7 5.0 1.6 1.1 5.8 15.2 21.1 0.5 
SI Salvador 5,2 l . o 1*9 3.5 6.1 6*1 3.6 3.3 
Guatemala • 5.7 3.8 5.8 7.1 3*3 1.2 
Quyana 
1.8 1.3 Haiti 0..7 1,9 7.o 5.5 3.5 3,3 
Honduras j.:0 1.7 3.6 3.1 6c7 -2.7 -3.2 
Jamaioa 
6.6 Mexico 7,o 743 3.1 7.3 7.9 3.8 
Nioaragua 6.9 3.5 . U.6 1.6 3.2 8.6 -3.0 
Panama 8*0 7.5 6.1 8.7 6.9 1.5 -0.9 1.7 
Paraguay 1.7 3,8 6.6 4.5 5.8 11.1 8.0 5.5 
Pera 6.0 5-2 10» 8 5.0 5.1 8.8 8.7 1.9 
Domini ean Republio 5.7 .. 8.1 10.0 9.3 13.7 12.2 12.2 12.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 
0.1 Uruguay . 1.6 2o8 5.2 " -0.9 -2.5 3.9 -2.8 
Venezuela 3.9 3.6 5.9 8.1 6.2 12.9 15.1 -12.0 
Latin Ameri oa ¿-i te ¿al te & 2 ISsS 
bJ At market prices. 
Table II-3 
LATIN AMERICA« GROWTH RATE OF 'THS PER CAPITA OSOSS; DOMESTIC "PRODUCT AT IMPORT EXCHANGE RATES g / 
(Annual rates, percentages) 






1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Argentina ' 2.9 2.8 •4.0 1.3 2.9 2.5 5.2 -2.7 
Barbados • • • • • • A • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • If 
Bolivia 3.1 3.9 2.9 1.4 2.3 2.7 3.1 4.3 
Brazil 3.0 ' 4.5 - 6.4 8.1 7.3 8.3 6.6 1.1 
Colonbia 1.8 " 2.3 3.2 . 2.5 .. 4.2 3.8 2.8 0.5 
Costa Rloa 3.3 3.8 3.7 - 3.7 5.8 4.8 1.5 -0.3 
Cuba « • •• • • • . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Chile 2.3 1.9 • 1.8 5.7 -1.9 -5.3 2.5 -16.2 
Ecuador 1.8 1.9 0.3 • 2.4 4.0 9«6 2.9 4.6 
CI Salvador 2,2 0.9 0.0 - 1 . 0 2.7 0.7 3.3 0.0 
Guatemala 2*6 ' 2.8 2.6 - 2.8 4.3 • 3.6 2.5 -0.7 
Guyana • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • • • 
Haiti ; •' -0-4 • 2.3 3.4 1.1 .. 2,2 1.1 1.1 
Honduras 1.5 -0.7 0.4 0.4 1.4 -3.5 -3.3 
Jamaica • * <5 * •* - • • • . . . • . . . • • • . . . 
Maxi 00 3.6 ' v 3.6 ' 3.6 ; 0.2 3.7 • 4.2 2.6 0.4 
Nicaragua 4.1 * 1.2 0.0 2.3 :. -0.9 . 0.7 •5.7 -2.2 
Panama 4.8 - 4.6 3.9 5.7 . 3.4 . - 3.7 -0.2 ". 0.4 
Paraguay 2.0 1=5 3.2 1.5 2.3 4.8 5.3 5.1 
Peru 2.4 1.3 5.9 3.3 3.0 2.5 3.5 1.0 
Domini can Republio 1.8 4.2 7.2 7.0 8.7 7.8 5.8 2.2 
Trinidad and Tobago • • • M » • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • It 
Uruguay 0.3 1.2 3.7 »2.0 -4.3 -o . l .. 0.9 2.5 
Venezuela 2.5 1.4 4.1 -0.2 0.6 2.8 1.5 3.6 
latin America Ja2 M M 4*1 
^ At market prloes. 
Table XLJt 
LATIN AMERICA: MANUFACTURING 
Share of the manufacturing industry 
in the generation of the gross. Rate of growth of the 
domestio produot manufacturing industry 
Country (percentage of ~ the gross domasti« • (annual rates, percentage) . 
produot at 1970 prices) 








Argentina 26o3 3O.2 32.7 32» 2 5*6 5.1 6.1 7.2 -3.6 
Bolivia II06 12.9 • 13.0 . 13.6 6*7 6.1 1.9 6.0 11.3 
firaeil 22a 3 21.8 ... 26*2 « . 6 , 7.0 10.1 13.7 7.1 3.7 
Colombia 16,1 17.5 18.9 18.8 6.0 . 6.1 9.9 6.6 3.1 
Costa Rica s/ l2o1 . 15.1 16.1 . 17*2 8.8 9.5 8.7 8.7 5.0 
Cuba « « • • • • • • • • • • ... • • • • • • • • • ... 
Chile 27.2 29.1 23.8 5.5 3.6 3»7 -1.1 -27*0 
Ecuador 17*0 .. 19.0 . 18.6 ... 20.3 6.1 6.3 7.9 11.6 12.6 
El Salvador 13*8 17.6 , 18.2 18.1 8.1 5.7 5.8 6.0 3.1 
Guatemala 11*7 11.6 . 11.8 11.5 7.6 8.2 6»9 1.7 1.5 
Haiti 8.8 9«8 . 10.8 u.7 1*6 1.1 6C1 9.8 1e8 
Honduras 11,0 . 15.2 16.0 3.7 1.7 ra -0.1 6,2 
Moxlo« 1?.2 2.**1 . 23*9 9.1 8.8 6.9 5.7 1*1 
Kloaragua 11*9 17,5 . 17.8 17*8 11.1 8.1 1.3 9.1 0.6 
Panama 11-6 , 13*9 U . l 9*6 5*7 .1.1 -2«0 
Paraguay 1%2 • l?e3 . 1V«6 .. 17*5 6.0 5.6 6*7 8.9 7 « ° 
Peru 1>3 16,8 . ' iÓ.l 18.7 7.1 5*8 7.8 8.0 6.0 
Dominioan Republic 14.6 16.7 . 17.0 17*5 6.5 13«9 12o2 11.2 7.2 
Uruguay a/ 21.2 2la3 « . 1 1.5 2.1 -1.0 3.6 6.7 
Venezuela 9.2 11.1 12.1 13.1 7*1 5.2 6.8 9.0 12.8 
Latin America . 
(19 countries) 20e3 23.0 21.2 ' 23*9 6.9 7.5 8.6 -6.1 1.5 
a/ Ino ludi ng mining ani quarrying* 
Table J I -5 - ; 
UTIM AMERKAt 'AGiffCULTORAL SECTOR • 
Share of the agrloultural seat or 
in the generation of the product' * Bate ef growth of the agrloultural sector 
(percentages of the gross domestle (annual rates, percentage) 
Country produot at 1370.prices) 








Argentina 15.6 13.1 11.9 12.0 2.4 ' 
«., * 
1.1 0.5 7.2 -1.2 
Bolivia 16.9 16.1 15.8 1.8 0.2 2.9 3.5 6.7 
Brazil • 16.5 1U.3 12.4 12.2 4.4 . 3.0 6.4 8.5 3.4 
Colombia 33.0 28.6 26.5 26.8 3.8 4.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 
Costa Rica 29.3 25.0 23.2 5.0 5.1 5.8 -0.8 1.8 
Cuba « • • . . . • . . . . ... . . . . • • » . , > • • • • • • . . . 
Chile 9.8 7.9 6.4 8.3 2.3 2.7 -5.5 12.7 0.4 
Eouader 38.1 29.2 24.0 22.1 2.5 0.8 1.7 2.0 3.7 
El Salvador 35.7 30.6 28.6. . 28.1 . 3.9 3.9. 2.4 10.2 -2.0 
Guatemala 32.6 30.1 30.8 30.1 4.4 4.7 7.4 4.5 1.0 
Haiti 48.8 50«8 47.4 45.2 0.9 1.3 2r,5 1.0 0.3 
Honduras • 32.7 • 34C6; . •34.9» • 31.7 • 5.2 3«2 4.5 -2.8 -6.1 
Mexico 16.1 l i .8 10.4' 3.7 3.7 2.7 1.6 0.9 1.9 
Nicaragua 26 A 26,3 26.9 26.9 6.8 2.1 4.6 9.3 e.8 
Panama "25.7 20r7 ' ' 19.0'• • 18.8 . 5.3 : • 4.9 • 3» 2- -1.5 6.2 
Paraguay 3?«5 3^.3 ' : 33«4' . 33.0 3.2 1.8, 5.2 9.8 5o2 
Peru 24.6 19.8 16,4 15.3 2.7 2o8 -2.7 4.1 -0.5 
Dominican Republlo 33.8 S .8 • 21.7, 19W1 2.3 • 5.8 5.2: 3.3 -1.5 
Uruguay 11.9 * 12.6 ' 12»1; 11.6 3.0 2.8 -2.6 e.8 1.3 
Venezuela 7.3 7.5 7 el 7.4 5.2 5.3 2.4 7i6 9.1 
Latin America ' " • 
(19 oouRtrles) 18,2 14.9 13.5 13.2 3.6 2.9 3.0 5.3 2.3 
Table XI-6 
LATIN AMERICA: RATES OF GROWTH OF TOTAL DEMAND 
(Annual rates, percentages) 
Country 
Exports Dome stio demand " Total demand 
1371 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Argentina -11.7 -1.8 14.7 1.6 -20.1 4.1 4.0 3.0 8.2 -0.5 2.8 : -3.6 3.8 7.8 -1.8 
Barbados 
Bolivia 10.9 9.7 7.6 0.2 -11,4 2.6 4.7 4.6 12.1 13.2 4.0 5.6 5.2 9.8 8.8 
Brazil 9.6 12.5 20.8 1.4 7.9 11*7 10.9 11.9 12.0 2.5 11.6 11.0 12.5 11.2 2.8 
Colombia 3.7 12.4 3.0 6.6 8.4 6.5 4.7 7.3 5.9 1.7 6.2 5.6 . 6.8 6.0 2.5 
Costa Rioa 6.9 17.2 2.0 3.4 1.5 7.4 3.6 8.4 6.7 0,2 7.3 6.4 6.9 6.0 0.4 
Cuba 
Chile 8.5 -10.2 7.7 11.7 6o5 2.6 -3.9 2.8 -18.2 6.7 0.9 : -2.5 3.9 -15.7 
Ecuador 9.5 37.2 35.6 -7.1 -2a5 5.5 2.5 11.6 14.6 9.1 6.0 6.8 15.4 10.5 7.3 
El Salvador 7.7 16,0 -2.7 12.4 1.0 5.9 3.3 10.1 6.9 2.1 6.2 5.9 7.5 8.0 1.9 
Guatemala 2.6 15.1 10.9 9.4. ,• 3.3 . 6.1 4,0 7.1 5.6 1.6 5.6 5.7 ; 7.8 6.2 1.9 
Guyana -
Haiti 24.2 -5.6 -2.6 0.7 -13.3 4.8 4.8 5.5 2.6 4.9 6,8 : 3.6 4.7 2.5 3.1 
Honduras 6.8 3.6 2.1 -0.3 -2.2 -2.3 1.1 9.0 6.1 -4.3 -Ó.4 ' 1.7 7 * 4.8 -3.9 
Jamaica * ' '' . 
Mexico 4.4 15.4 7.6 0.0 -10.3 2.6 7.2 8.4 7.7 4.4 2.7 7.8 8.3 7.1 3.3 
Nicaragua 5.0 15.5 16.7 Jf.4 -1.1 4.7 0.3 9.8 17.5 -6.6 4.8 3.4 11.4 12.4 -5.5 
Panama 6.3 1.3 6.3 7.8 9.9 9.1 8.1 3.8 1.2 -2.0 8.3 6„4 4.4 2.9 1.1 
Paraguay -5.0 6.6 2.3 7.7 2.9 5.5 2.8 12,7 8.8 5.8 4.2 3.3 11.5 8.7 5.5 
Paru -7.5 7.5 -14.0 .1.4 -8.1 8.6 5.2 10,0 13.8 6.3 5.9 5.5 6.4 11.5 4.7 
Dominican Republie 16.2 $ .5 3.8 J+.6 -8.7 8.7 9.8 11.0 15.4 7.3 9.7 12.1 , 9.9 I2.3 5.2 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay -16.5 4.8 •4.0 • 8.8 25.0 -0.1 -545 3.7 0.5 1.1 -1.8 -4.6 2.9 1.3 3.4 
Venezuela -5.4 -4.4 6.3 -7.1 -20.1 5.7 6.9 3.9 10,0 13.6 3.4 4.7 4.3 6.9 8.3 
Latin America 1.2 6.9 9.2 0.8 -4.5 6.6 7.0 7.7 9.4 2.5 6.1 7.9 8.5 1.9 
Table 11-7 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC DEMAND 
(Annual rates, percentages) 
Gross" domestic investment Sotal consumption Domestio demand 
Country . — —: — — 
1371 1972 1973 1374 . 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 " 1975 
Argentina 7.8 ' 7.9 -2.1 10.9 -12.5 3.1 3.0' 4.5 7.5 2.8 4,1 " 4 . 0 . 3.0 8.2 -0.5 
Barbados 
Bolivia : -0.6 -2.0 27.6. 18.0 24.0 ••" 3.1 5.9 ' ; 0.9 10.9 ' 10,8 2.6 - 4.7 4.6 : 12.1 . 13.2 
Brazil . 19.6 15.4 20.2 15.7 3 . 6 ' •9.7 9.7 9.5 10,8 2,1 ' 11.7 • I0.9 11.9 12.0 , 2.5 
Colombia . -1.9 -11.1 52.6 -19.0 . 6.3-' 6.6 .''12,0 -3.5 .; 8.3 6.5 . 4.7 .. ' 7.3 5.9 . : 1.7 
Costa Rioa 25.3 -9.2 20.5 8.4 9.3 3.1 7.2 5.5 : 6.2 -2.5 : 7.4 3.6 ' 8.4 .. 6.7 ' 0,2 
Cuba 
Chile. '-"' -3 .3 -19.7 ... 26.4 • J*4.9 8.3 =. , 6.3 ' -5.5 -0.7 -13.3 6.5 2«6 : *-3.9 ' 2.8 -18,2 
Ecuador , 36.8 . -10.3 .'21.6 18.9 16.3 -2.0 6.7 ' 8,8 ' 13.3 6,8 5.5 2.5 11.6 14.6 "' 9.1 
El Salvador 22.5 -I2.9 15.8 24.0 -11.2 3.3 6.2 . 9.6 .. . 4.2 . , 4,6 . , 5.9 3.3 • 10.4 6.9 - ' 2.1 
Guatemala,. 15.0- -lit .8 18.0 19.4 -16.4 ,. 4.8 7.1 5.7 .. . 3.6 : • 4,6 , • : 6.1 , 4.0 - • 7 .1 • 5.6 ; 1.6 
Guyana • . 't 
4.9 Hait i 15.5 10.!+ ; 8.9 .'•  7.0 ... 9.8 4.1. ; 4,4- 5.2 • 2.3; \ 4.5 4.8 • 4.8 ' 5.5 ' 2.6* 
Honduras -21.5 -4.8 ' 23.9 31.3 -18.I 2.8 2,3 6.3 0,8 -0.5 -2.3 1.1 9.0 . . 6.1 . .^4.3 
Jamaica 
Mexioo -3.5 12.5 16,2 15.9 5.3 ' ' 4.2 . -•'.5.8 ' 6.3 5.4 4.1 .. 2.6 : 7.2 '•'. 8.4 ' 7.7 4.4 
Nicaragua 3.1 -24.5 78.8 35.3 '-32. 1 : 5.1 ' " 5.3 ' -0,1 I2.9 1.3 : ; 4.7 0.3 • : 9.8 17.5 • -6.6 
Panamg, = 14.0 20.8 ' -5 .3 -7*5 -17.8 ' 7.4 3.6 7.6 4,5 3.2 ' 9.1 8.1 3.8 1.2 -2.0 
Paraguay • 7.5 7.8 45.6 • 10.3 17.8 5.2 2.0 . . 6.7 . 8.4, . . 2.8 ; 5.5 2.8 , 12.7 8.8 ~ • 5.8 
Peru ;; ' 22.0 0.0 7 . 7 . 29,0, .. 15.7 6,7 6.1.. 10,4 11.4 4.6 8.6 5.2 . 10.0' 13.8 6.3 
Dominicali Republic 16.0 26.2 18.5 20.0 ' 7.1 7.1 ' 6.0 8.9 14.0 .. .7.3 ' 8.7. . 9.8... 11.0 15.4 7.3 
Trinidad and Tebago 
Uruguay 11.5 -16.3 -3.6 -1,8 0,0 -1.6 . -4.0 4.6 0.8 1.2 -0 .1 -5.5 3.7 Ó.5' 1.1 
Venezuela 3.5 11.4 12.6 -2.6 15.0 6.6 5.1 0.2 16.1 13.0 5.7 6.9 3.9 10,0 13.6 
Latin America 8.7 9.1 12.8 15.0 0.3 6.1 6.4 6.4 7.8 3.2 6.6 7.0 7.7 9.4 2.5 
Table I1-8 
LATIN AMERICA:-ÏOTAL SUPPLY, RATES-OP GROWTH.. 
- " (Annual rates, percentages) . 
Country 
Imports Gross domestic product Total supply 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 : l'97l • ,1972 :• ' 1973 • 1974 '.1.975 
3.5 • - -4.5 : 3.2 22.6 -6.5 •',2.7 ; 4.3 3.9 : • 6.6 ; . -1.4 .2.8 3.6 3.8 7.8 -1.8 
4.8 , .. 8.2 ' 4,2 . 29.2 16.7 3.8 ; "5.1 5.4 . 5.7 ' 6.8 - 4 . 0 '5.6 " 5 . 2 :. 9 . 0 v' 8.8 
15.5 . X9.5 .25.7 29.2" ; -8.4 11.3 10.4 ,. 11.4 9.6 ' 4 . 0 11.6 i i . o 12.5 11.2 
8 .6 • -7.3 " 4.4 6.6 ' -9.0 "•'-5.8 .7.8 7.1 5.9 ' " ' 4.1 6.2 ' 5.6 ; ' 6. 8 , , 6.0 r 2.5 
9.2 0 . 0 4.3 Ú . 1 -5.9 ••'6.6 -3.8 ' 7.8 ' : 4.3 • 2.6 ' 7.3 • •6.4 6.9 ' 6 . 0 -'0.4 
0.0 ' 8.2' 1.5 - 2 2 , 7 7.7 ,-0.1 -3.6 4.3 -14.7 6.7 0.9 ' -2.5 3-9 -15.7 
7.3 4.3 27.2 •23.7 4.8 5.7 7.3 ' Ï3 .1 6.3 8.0 6.0 6.8 15.4 1Q.5 7.3 
12.8 6.2 21.1 13.2 . -2.7 4.6 -5.8 •'• 3.8 • 6.4 ' k 6.2 5.9 J 7.5 •8.0 : 1.9 
5.6 -3.7 13.9 : 10 .7 0.3 5.6 7.3 6.8 5.5 2.2 5.6 5.7 7.8 -6.2 1.9 
8.5 4.1 . 5.6 - 9 . 8 ' -0.5 ' 6.5 3.5 - .4.5 .4.4 3.6 6.0 : • 3.6 4.7 •.. 2.5' . 3.1 
- 1 2 . 9 - 6 . 1 • 17.0 21.1 -15.0 . , 3.8-• 3.9 .. . 5.0 ' 0.1 • 0.0 . -0 .4 . . . 7.4 ' - 4.8 . -3.9 
•4.8 14.2 15.5' 18.2 -2.3. - 3.4 7.3' • > 7.6 , 5.9 3.9- " 2.7' ' 7.0 8.3 ' 7 .1 . : 3.3 
2.3 37.5. . 21.1 - 2 1 . 4 5.5 2.4 4.1 9.2 " 1.0' " 4.8 - 3.4 " 1 1 . 4 1 2 . 4 -5.5 
7 . 4 ; 6.5 -0.8 3.5-' '. -4.7 a.7:.< 6-3 6.5.. 2.6 3.3 8.3 6.4 4.4 2.9 1.1 
3.0"., -7.9 36.1 • 10 .7 ' -7.6 4.4 • 5.1 7.8 0.3- 8.0 4.2 3.3 11.5 8.7 5.5 
1.6 2.1 .. 13.0 43.3 ' 8.3 6.5 6.1 5-4 " 6.6 ? 4 . 0 5.9 5.5 6.4 .11.5' 4.7 6.Ï' 11.0 3.9 23*0 • , 1.2 ., 10.6 1 2 . 4 . 11.2-' 8.9 : 6.2 , 5.7 , 1 2 . 1 „ 9.9 , , 12.3' 5.2 
-0.2 -15.3 22.3 -3.8 1.3 -1.0 " -3.4 0.9 " '1.9 3.6 -1.8 -4.6 • 2.9 1.3 3.4 
6.3 10.1 ..'. -2.5 18.8 15.7 2.8 • 3.6 5.8 4.5 6.6 3.4 4.7 4.3 6.9 8.3 



























UTB! AMERICA.: ,EWESTM0!T COEFFICIENTS 
Country I960 1965 ' 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Percentages of the sross dom estiq j r o d jot^ at 1 ,#0 prices 
Argentina . 19.9 I8.0 20.4 ,21.4 ' 22.1 20.9 21.7 19.3 
Barbados • • • • • • • • • .... • • » « • • » 09 9 
Bolivia 12.3 16.4 15.6 14.9 13.9 16.8 18.8 21.8 
Brazil 21.0 20.6 20.6 22.1 23.1 24.9 26.3 26.2 




15.1 21.7 * 20.5 . ' 24.1~ 20.2 22.5 23.4 24.9 
• • • 
14.9 
• • • 
15.8 ' 
f • • 
15.6 
• • • 
l4.o 
• • • 
11.2 
. . . 
12.7 
• • • 
15.4 
• • • 
9.9 
Ecuador 13.1 11.1 20.3 26.2 21.9 23.6 26.4 28.4 
El Salvador 16.6 16.7 13.2 15.5 >12.8 14.3 16.6 14.3 
Guatemala 11.5 13.2 12.8 l4.o ' li.l 12.2 13.9 U .4 
Guyana • • * • « • • • • ' • . . . • • • • • • • 
Haiti 5.3 6.2 7.0 7.5 •8*0 8.4 8.6 9.1 
Honduras 13.0 15.1 21.9 •16.4 15.1 17.8 23.4 19.1 
Jarcaica • • • - • • • »1« " • • • « • « • • • 
Mexi co .20.5 20.2 21.5 '20.1 2 i ; i 22.8 24.9 • 25.2 
Nioaragua 13.2 19.0 17.3 16.9 12.5 21.5 26.6 17.9 
Panama 16.0 17.8 •.26.4 27.6 31.4 27.9 25.2 ' 20.0 
Paraguay 12.5 14.9 14-.7 15:2 15.6 2I.0 21.4 23.3 
Peru 15.3 15.9 12. 2 14.0 1-3.2 13.5 16.3 18.1 
Dominioan Republic 1,0.1 • -9.4 19.1 2<0«'l 22.6 24.0 26.5 26.7 
Trinidad and Tobago * > • « ' • • • * > * » • 1 »•. • • • • * • 
Uruguay 13.4 ; 9.0 U .4 12.9 11.2 10.7 10.3 9.9 
Venezuela ' 26.0 •25.8 27.7 27.5 30.6 32.0 29.8 32.1 
Latin America 19..7 1 9 . 2 JO j j . 21.3 ¿2*3 ¿ k o 
Distribution 
aooqrdln^ to^thei ralue 
oowtries 
Less than 10»0 - 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 
10.0 -14.9 9 3 5 5 7 • 5 2 • • 2 ... 
15 .0-19 .9 5"" 9 4 -4 2 3 • 4 5 
20« 0 and over 4 4 9 9 9 10 12 9 
"Table 11-10 " 
•"LATIN-AMERICA: GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS COEFFICIENTS'IN TERM» OF THE GROSS NATIONAL INCOME 
Previous decade 
Country , Seoond >1970 
Decade half of 
deoade 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
iroerrta^s 0; ̂  .thejgwsj rational incorna at. 1970 prices 
Argentina 18,2 18.5 . 19.? 20.1 .21.4 22,5 21.7 16.8 
Barbados • « • • • • • • • • •• • l< • •• 
Bolivia 10.0 .11.5 13.5 11.4 . , 10.1 15.3 20.8 12.9 
Brazil 19,2 . 18.8 . 19.3 19.9 ,. ?o.9 22.8 21.2 22.0 
Colombia 18.1 , 17.9 . 17.8 16.7 18.3 16.2 23.8 18.9 
Costa Rica 11.4 ,= 11.2 . 12.9 13.7 .42.8 16.0 12.6 17.2 
Cuba • •• • •' • • • • • • , , ••• ... • • • 
Chile 13.9 . 14.5 15.0 .12.1 6.4 8.4 13.9 6.0 
Ecuador 10.3 10.1 13.6 .18.4 15.9 21.0 24.9 22.3 
El Salvador . 12.5 ,12.2 13.9 14.2 13.7 10.9 10.1 8.6 
Guatemala 10.0 10.9 12.5 12.0 U . l 12.9 12.8 9.8 
Guyana • • • « • . " • • • v" ••• • • • • • • 
Haiti 3.4 . 4.4 5.7 ' 6.5 ; 8 . 1 4.6 5.4 5.9 
Honduras 1.2,5 13.3 12,8 13.4 14,2 14.3 l4,o 9.8 
Jarnal ca • • • « 0 • . • • • „ • • • * * * • • • • • • • • • 
Maxi 00 18.8 19.0 18.7 . 18.1 19.2 20.1 20.7 20.3 
Nicaragua . 12.2 11.3 12.7 12.5 11.7 16.8 11.3 7.1 
Panama 16.7 19.3 20.2 21.2 23.8 21.3 14.9 12.1 
Paraguay . 10.6 11.2 11.6 11.3 14.3 18.2 17.9 20.0 
Peru 14.1 13.2 14.6 13.4 12.8 11.3 9.0 6.9 
Domlnioan Republic 10.1 9.8 12.1 14.2 19.5 21.0 19.6 23.2 
Trinidad and Tobago • • • • 0 • ... • • • • • • , • • • • •• 
Uruguay 10.5 10.1 9.3 10.1 11.4 10,9 7.2 6.3 
Venezuela 28.7 27.6 28.5 28.9 29.1 35.9 45.3 36.2 
Latin America 2M 18.2 18.8 18.8 21.1 22.2 20.2 
Distribution 0 fcountries 
according to the value 
of the indioator 
Kugber of countries 
Less than 10.0 1 2 2 1 2 2 "3 " 8 
10.0 - 14.9 12 11 10 11 9 5 7 2 
15.0 - 19.9 5 5 5 4 4 5 2 3 
20.0 and over 1 1 ? 3 4 7 7 6 
DBS« 
Table II-ll -• 
LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF GROSS NATIONAL SAVINGS IN THE FINANCING OF INVESTMENT 








1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Argentina 98.2 99.7 96,9 93.3 96.6 109.8 101.5 87.2 
Barbados • • • • • • 9 9 9 • • • • • « » • * • * • 
Bolivia 63.4 69.6 . 84.9 72.8" 68.5 . 87.1 118.4 59.6 
Brazil 96.0 94.8 93.1 88.5 89.5 91.1 79-7 82.1 
Colombia ^ 84,3 82.5 78,9 72,2 88,0 95.6 97.6 97.3 
Costa Rioa 63.6 61.9 62.1 54,9 59.6 67.9 50.3 64.7 
Cuba 1 * • «1« « • • » « • • • 99 9 • • • 
Chile 86,3 92.9 94.8 82.3 54.6 63.1 87.6 54.4 
Souador 75.4 68,8 66.2 68.1 67.9 85.3 101.6 80.8 
El Salvador 85.0 .83.2 105.1 91.1 106,3 77.5 60.2 58.8 
Guat emala" 80.8 84.5 96.7 83.6 96.2 102.3 86.4 81.7 
Guyana • * * • • « 9 * • * » « • • • » • • • • * • » • 
Malti 58.1 77.7 83.6 86.6 104..7 , 54.8 62.8 65.2 
Honduras 73.8 68.5 56.8 79.1 90.5 78.3 58.7 •47.5 
Jamaioa 
• 9 9 9 99 • • • • • • • 9 • * * * • • • • • • 
Me.ù oo 89.6 88,5 85.1 83.3 89.1 86,6 81.6 78.9 
Nicaragua 69.7 61.1 71,1 7o,8 92.2 73,3 41.3 36.6 
Panama 75.4 79.3 74.2 74,6 74,1 ' 73.0 53.4 52.5 
Paraguay 71.4 67.1 77.6 73.5 91.7 89.3 85.9 86.1 
Peru 88.7 ,86.8 117.5 92.6 93.5 82.9 56.0 37.5 
Eominioan Republio 68.1 59.8 63.4 70.5 86,3 87.2 75.8 94.4 
Trinidad and Tobago • • • • 9 9 • • r • • « * * 9 • * • • # * • • • 
Uruguay 96.5 97.4 80.7 78,1 102.5 105.8 63.3 59.7 
Venezuela 107.0 97.4 95.9 100.9 96.2 116.9 206.0 138.5 
Latin America 93.3 _ 91.9 9,0.7 88.3 89.8 94.0 94.0 82,4 
Tabla 11-12 
LATIN AMERICA: OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
Good and services Financing 
. Terms,.. 
Net 
payment of Net 
Imports Exports 
. M - 2 
of 
p r o f i t s external 
(M) (E) trade and financing 
extecx 
interest-
Mill ions of dol lars a t 1970 pr i oés 
1550-1954 1 867.2 1 481 .5 385.7 1 I83.6 787.8 - 1 0 . 1 
1955-1959 3 064.7 2 132 .1 932.6 1 760.5 1 154 .4 326.5 
1960-1969 - 2 382.2 2 855.5 A73.3 627.1 947.8 - 152 .6 
1970 2 889.0 3 4 12 . 0 -523.O 0 . 0 800.3 277.3 
1971 3 071.4 3 300.8 -229.4 547.4 947.9 I 7 I . I 
1972 3 3.55.2 3 307.0 48.2 851.1 1 133.2 33O.3 
1973 3 4O6.2 3 631.4 -225.2 1 888.9 1 515.9 -598 .2 
1974 4 127 .6 . 3 394.5 733.1 8 585.3 3 503.I -4 345.1 
1975 4 ,705 .2 2 821.6 1 883.6 4 824.5 1 4op.4 - 1 535.5 
1971-1975 3 733.1 3 291 .I ¥+2.0 3 339.4 1 701 . 1 - 1 196.3 
Millions of dol lars at 1950-1954 1 prices 
1950-1954 1 1 8 1 . 9 1 663.3 - 4 8 1 . 4 >• - 0 . 8 476.5 - 4 . 1 
1955-1959 1 940.2 • 2 394.3 -454 .1 '. 52.7 715.2 208.3 
1960-1969 1 507.9 3 206.3 - 1 698.4 - 1 037.5 571.4 -89 .5 
1970 1 828.5 3 833.7 -2 005.2 - 1 674.2 506,5 175.5 
19/1 1 944,1 3 708.2 - 1 764.1 • - 1 268.9 602.1 106 .9 
1972 2 123 .8 3 713 .6 -1 589.8 - 1 087.1 7 1 1 . 3 208.6 
1973 2 156 .5 4 078.7 - 1 922.2 -657 .1 892.7 -372 .4 
1974 2 6 1 1 . 7 3 812.0 - 1 200.3 3 2 1 1 . 2 1 874.7 -2 536.8 
1975 ' 2 978.2 3 168 .8 - 1 9 0 . 6 1 457 .6 723.4 , - 9 2 4 . 8 
I97I-I975 2 362.9 3 696.3 - 1 ' 333 .4 331 .1 960.8 - 703 .7 
Table II-I3 
UT IN AMERICA: NON OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES 









Hilllons of dollars at lj70 prices 








1950-1954 7 601.1 6 253.0 1 348.1 1 500,2 729.5 577.4 
1955-1959 8 343.3 7 680.9 662.4 352.9 732.9 1 o42.3 
1960-1969 10 452.1 10 708.6 -256.5 -441.3 1.337.3 1 522.0 
1970 14 706.0 13 993.5 712.5 0.0 1 875.7 2 588.2 
1971 15 344.2 14 311.9 1 032.5 r.819.1 1 901.2 3 752.6 
1972 16 489.3 15 519.I 970,2 -333.6 2 107.4 3 411,2 
1973 18 895.4 16 932.7 1 962.7 1 394.1 2 497.1 3 065.7 1974 22 794.0 17 344.2 5 449,8 1 000.7 2 770.3 7 219.4 
1975 21 400.8 16 993.9 4 4O6.9 -553.4 3 528.3 8 488.6 
1971-1975 18 984,7 16 220,4 2 764.3 13 7.7 2 560.9 5 187.5 
1950-1954 
Millions of dollars at 1950-1954 prices 
5 897.7 5 885.4 12.3 7,1 44o,4 .445,5 
1955-1959 6 473.3 7 227.6 -754,3 -1 077.5 471.4 794,5 
1960-1969 8 llo.l 10 079.2 -1 969.I -2 192.2 958.5 1 181 .6 
1970 11 4O8.9 13 1.64,2 -1 755.3 -2 307.7 1 455.1 2 007.5 
1971 11 902.6 13 4è'8,6 -1 566,0 -3 02I.0 1 468.0 2 923.0 
1972 12,792.8. .. .14 606.4 ,.T1 813.6 -2 -864.3 1 613.8 2 664.5 
1973 14 666.0 15 936.2 -1 270.2 -1. 867,7 - .1 789.6 2 387.1 
1974 17 604.6 16 318.8 1 365.8 -2 650.2 1 644,5 5 660.5 
1975 16 610,0 15 985.1 624.9 -3 695.8 2 107.8 6 428.5 
1971-1975 l4 731.2 15 263.0 -53I.8 -2 819.8 1 724,7 4 012.7 
Table II-14 
LATIN ¿JCRICA: TERMS OF TRADE INDEX 
Ailo . ...Oil export ing 
countries a / 
Non -o i l 
exporting 
oountries 
L a t in : 
America 
1950-1954 . 177.5 121.4 130 .6 
1955-1959 1 6 1 . 8 103.4 U9.2 
I960-1969 1 2 1 . 9 94.9 ' 1 0 0 . 3 
1970 100 .0 100,0 100 .0 
1971 1 1 6 . 8 94.4 93.6 
1972 1 2 5 . 5 97.5 102.4 
1973 148.8 ' 107.0 114.4 
1974 327.0 101 .6 135.4 
1975 259.0 92.1 114.8 
a / Inc ludes B o l i v i a . Ecuador y Venezuela . 
Table 11-15" 
LATIN AMERICA:. BALANCE -OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of do l lar s ) . 
O i l export ing countr ies Non o i l export ing countr ies 
Latin 
Amerioa Tota l 
.Other o i l 
Venezuela, expor t ing Tota l 
countries 
Argentina B r a z i l Mexico 
Other non 




1970 506.7 624.0 -II7.3 -&37.9 67.O -229.O -428.0 — ¿+7.9 - 3 3 I . 2 
1971 7^7.9 984.0 - 236 . I - 2 0 9 I .6 -130.0 -905.0 -157.0 -899.6 -1 343.7 
1972 79O.6 996.7 - 2 0 6 . 1 -1 650,5 II5.I £974.0 ' - I I 7 . 2 -674.4 -859.9 
1973 2 606.6 2 5Ö+.2 42.4 -1 2Î2Ô.6 1 100.4 -1 07 2.9 -415.1 -84i,o 1 378.O 
1974 11 403.1 10 686.5 716 ,6 - 9 188.2 488.1 -6 135.1 -1 413.0 - 2 128,2 2 214.9 
1975 5 091 .3 5 042.4 48.9 - U 032.7 -888.7 -5 117.9 -2 0^.4 - 2 988.7 -5 941.4 
Net payments of p r o f i t s and in te re s t 
1970 . -784.5 -669.O -II5.5 - 2 159.I -223 .0 -428.0 -695.0 -813,1 -2 943.6 
1971 - 988 . 3 -874,0 -114.3 - 2 295.1 -256 .0 - 5 1 8 . 0 -738 .0 - 7 8 3 . 1 -3 283.4 
1972 -1 236,6 -1 061.9 -174.7 - 2 651.9 -333.3 -618 .8 -857.8 -842.0 -3 888.5 
1973 -1 793.8 -1 584.3 -209 .5 - 3 365.8 -394.6 -811.9 -1 137.2 -1 022,1 -5 159.6 
1974 -4 861 .4 -4 328.9 -532.5 -4 154.8 -334.3 -993.2 -1 619.7 -1 207.6 - 9 016.2 
1975 -2 214.8 -1 807,9 —406,9 - 5 682.2 ; , -428.6 -1 820.1 -1 920.7 -1 512.8 -7 897.0 
Balance on current, account 
1970 -352.7 -I3I.0 - 221 . 7 - 2 8 0 0 . 7 -157.0 -644.0 -1 075.Ö " ' -924,7 -3 153.4 
1971 -307.3 31.0 -338.3 -4 I83.7 -387.0 -1 412.0 -845.0 -1 539.7 -4 491 .0 
1972 - 5 2 0 . 2 -154.2 -366.O -4 065.6 -219.3 -1 591.7 -92O.7 -1 333-9 -4 585.8 
1973 7#.4 875.0 -147,6 -4 291.6 708 .2 -1 862.1 -1 489.1 -1 648,6 -3 564,2 
1974 6 421.6 6 22? „7 193.9 -13 027,5 151.4 -7 -2 934.1 -3 117,7 - 6 605,9 
1975 2 752 .6 3 099.7 -347.I -16 376.8 -1 319.7 - 6 923.0 -3 887.7 -4 ¿+6,4 - 1 3 624.2 
Movement of cap i t a l 
1970 438.6 221,0 217.6 4 260.2 437.0 1 278.0 1 15 .̂0 1 395.2 4 698.8 
1971 737.9 413.0 324.9 4 245.9 -72.0 2 026,0 1 027.0 1 264.9 4 983.8 
1972 826.0 365.9 460.1 6 470.0 170.4 4 lo4.8 1 140.9 1 053.9 7 296.0 
1973 -30 .9 - 2 6 3 . 3 232.4 7 460,6 -43.0 4 254.8 1 629.7 1 619.1 7 429.7 
1974 -1 773.5 -2 152.4 378,9 12 151.0 -119.2 6 248,2 2 964.1 3 057.9 10 377.5 
1975 -170.1 -751.6 58115 14 063.6 529.4 5 8#.7 4 P52.8 3 654.0 13 893.5 
Balanoe of payments before compensation 
1970 85.9 90.0 -4.1 1 459.5 280,0 634.0 75.0 470.5 1 545.4 
1971 430.6 444.0 -13.4 62.2 -459,0 614.0 182.0 274.8 492.8 
1972 305.8 211.7 94.1 2 4o4.4 -48.9 2 513.I 220.2 - 280 .0 2 7 1 0 . 2 
1973 696.5 611 .7 84.8 3 169.O 665.2 2 392,7 140.6 -28.9 3 865.5 
1974 4 Ö+8.1 4 075.3 572,8 -876.5 32.2 -878 .9 30.0 59.8 3 771.6 
1975 2 582.5 2 348.1 234.4 -2 313.2 -790.3 - 1 095.3 165.1 592.7 269.3 
Table I I - l 6 
_ . . . . . .... LATIN AMERICA-̂ t EXTERNAL. DEBT 
(Millions of dollar a),. 
... V i960 . . 1970 I97I 1972 . 1973 1 9 7 4 1975 
Argentina a / 5 *3.3 5 677.3 5 605.3 5 907.1 6 366.4 6 476.4 
B o l i v i a 165.5 410.1 527.3 • 592.7 702.0 763.7 820.4 
B r a z i l b/ 2 147.3 4 403.3 5.2^5.2 '6 621,6 ; 9'52l.o 12 571.5 17 165.7 
Colombia 545.4 1 822.7 2 102,7 • 2 4'24«7 ; 2 652*6 2 842 .1 2 998.5 
Chi le 0/ 627.1 2 358.0 2 451,0 '2 467.0 : 2 894.3 ' 3 202.8 4 087.5 
Ecuador 76.3 " 262.9 " 299.9 332.0 ^ 396.2 ; 427.5 . 413.5 
Mexico 894.3 3 852.0 4 291.0 4 785.0 5 688.3 '7 5T'.3 10 484.6 
Paraguay 43.9 198,5. 223.7 243.9 260.9 302.I 352.1 
Peru 374.5 1 1 8 o . o 1 411.0 1 436.0 "1 592.4 1 830.7 3 005.6 
Uruguay 547.5 541.6 571.9 : 671.5 730.3 761.2 966.1 
H a i t i ' ' 54.3 69.0 66.5 65.7 73.8 79.4 102.8 
Panama 47.9 402.2 634.1 907.6 ' •'"' 1 561.4 3 217.6 6 015.9 
Dominican Republic 80.0 281,4 318.6 389.4 '4o8.o 427.9 560.« 
Ccsta R ica 28.1 329.7 377.1 479.7 " 565.8 ; 629.8 806.2 
El Salvador '• 4o.i+ 2-21.8 219.8 245.8 ¿+9.1 * 272.9 420.9 
Guatemala 56.1 31606 314.5 . Jftf.4 382.3 434.5 H6.4 
Honduras 15.3 141.6 186.2 211.4 ¿+3.1 286.7 4o4.4 
Nicaragua ! 31.1 301.2 341.3 370.6 •: 511.0 664.0 
Lat in America (18 oountr les ) 9 853.5 22 704.2 25 299 .0 28 169.0 34'1??.2 4 2 465.1 56 191.0 
a / At the beginning of the year . 
•Table 11-17 
LATIN A1EPJCA: ffiOWTH RAE OF TBE ASUCULTURAL PRODUCTION 
(Annual r a tes , percentages) 
1950-1960 . , 156o-1$70 ' 1970-1975 
Argentina 2 . 1 2.3 2.4 
Barbado s 2 .6 2.0 - 1 . 1 
Bol iv ia 5.5 3.1 • 3 .9 
Brazi l v - r 3.7 3.4 
Colombia 2.7 2.9 3.7 
Costa Rica 3.5 6,0 3.0 
Cuba 1.7 " • 1.7 " • 0,6 
Chile - - 1 » 6 . 2.2 - 0 , 8 
Eouador ' 5.8 ' ' 3.9 ' 2 . 5 
El Salvador 3.5 . . .. 3.8 ... 3.0 
Guatemala • 4.5 4.8 3.7 
Guyana • 6 .0 . 1.3 0.2 
Hait i • ' . 0 .7 2.0 2.1 
Honduras • , 2 . 8 " .. .• 3.9 2.2 
Jamaica 5.3 0 .5 •> 0 .3 
Hesel 0 0 " " 5 . 1 2.3 
llicaragua '2.5 7.0 4.1 
Panama 3.2 5.1 1.3 
Paraguay 1.9 . 3.7 1.4 
Peru 3.3 2.9 0.9 
Dominican Republic ' 4.1 1.5 
Surinam 3.0 2.2 1.7 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.4 . 1 . 9 -2.9 
Uruguay 0 .6 2.0 . - 0 . 1 
Venezuela 5.3 5.2 4.0 
Latin America hi ¿ ¡ 0 2 ^ 
Table II-18 
LATIN AMERICA: MANUFACTURING 
Growth rate of -the manufacturing Industry 




Decade ha l f of 
deceda 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Argentina 5.6 5.1 6.3 5.8 6.7 6.8 7.2 -3.6 
Barbados • • • • M . 0 • • • t • 
B o l i v i a 6.7 6.4 5.4 2,8 5.4 6.5 6.0 •'• 11.3 
B r a z i l 7.0 10.4 11.0 1 1 , 3 14.1 15.8 7.1 , 3.7 
Colombia 6.0 6.4 8.7 8,6 9.5 11.6 6.6 3.4 
Costa Rioa 8.8 9.5 8,4 9.9 8.7 7.4 8.7 5.0 
Cuba • • • • • • 0 • • • • • • • • f.« • • • 
Chi le 5.5 3.6 1.3 13.7 2.8 -4.5 -1.4 - 2 7 . 0 
Ecuador 6.4 6.3 7.6 8,6 7.3 7.8 11.6 12 .6 
E l Salvador 8.1 5.7 3.7 7.0 3.8 6.7 6.0 3.4 
Guatemala 7.6 8 .2 3.5 7.2 5.5 8 . 1 4.7 1.5 
Guyana * • • • • t 0 • * • • « • • • • • • • • • • M 
H a i t i 1.6 4.4 18.8 6 .0 8 . 6 10.8 9.8 4.8 
Honduras 3.7 4.7 5.6 ' 5.5 '7.8 8 . 1 -0.4 6 .2 
Jamaica - • « • « • « a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Mexico 9,1 8.3 8.7 3.2 8.5 9.0 5.7 4.4 
Nioaragua 11.1 8.1 9.4 4.8 6.5 1,8 9.4 0 . 6 
Panama 11.1 9.6 6.1 8.2 4.4 4,6 -4.4 . -2.0 
Paraguay 6.0 5.6 7.6 5.6 7.0 7.5 8.9 7.0 
Peru 7.4 5.8 10.9 8.6 7.3 7.4 8,0 6,0 
Dominican Republ ic 6,5 13.9 19 .0 13.2 10.4 13 .0 llf 2 7.2 
Tr in idad and Tobago • • • • M 4 • « • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Uruguay a/ 1.5 2.4 4.1 - 1 . 8 -0.4 - 0 . 8 3.6 6.7 
Venezuela 7.1 5.2 10,0 6.4 8.3 5.8 9.0 12 .8 
La t in Amerioa b/ 6*2 Z i i 8.3 2*2 hi hi 6j4 hi 
a / Inoludlng mining and quarry ing . 
b { Excluding Cuba înd eng l l sh -speaking Caribbean countr ies . 
Table 11-19 
lathi /¿erica: shajxj of countries m moss regiokal ìmìufactukiito product a / 
( P e r c e n t a g e s ) 
USO 
A r g e n t i n a 2 9 , 7 
Barbados 
B o l i v i a ' 0 . 8 
B r a 2 i l 23.2 
Colombia 3 ,9 
C o s t a R i c a 0 . 3 
Cuba 
C h i l e 8 . 8 
Ecuador 1 , 2 
E l S a l v a d o r 0 . 5 
Guatemala 0 .9 
Guyana 
H a i t i 0 .3 
Honduras 0 . 3 
Jamaica 
Mex ico 19 .6 
N i c a r a g u a 0 , 3 
Panama 0 . 3 
Paraguay 0 ,5 
P e r u 2 ,6 
Dominican R e p u b l i c 0 , 7 
T r i n i d a d and Tobago 
Uruguay 3 , 5 
V e n e z u e l a 2 , 8 
L a t i n America 100.0 
a / A t f a c t o r c o s t , i n d o l l a r s a t 1970 p r i c e s . 
i960 1970 1975 
2*4.2 21.5 I9.3 
0.1+ 0,4 0,4 
30.2 30.5 35.9 
4,0 3.6 3.8 
0 . 4 0 . 4 0 . 4 
7.5 6.6 3.8 
1.0 1,0 1.1 
0,5 0.5 0.5 
0,3 0,2 0.8 
0,2 0.1 0.1 
0,4 0,3 0.3 
19,4 23,8 23a 
0.3 o,4 0,4 
0.3 0 , 5 0,4 
0.3 0.3 0.3 
2,8 3,0 3.1 
0.7 0,7 0.9 
2.8 1,7 1.3 
3.9 3.9 4.3 
100,0 100.0 100.0 

--Table" -III-l 
LATIN AMERICA* M CM -OIL-EXPORT DIG COUNTRIES (11 COUNTRIES) a/: GROWTH, TRADE GAP AND FOREIGN FINANCING, I970-I980 
SCENARIO A 
• I970 1971' 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 - - 1979 1980 
Growth r a t e s ( p e r cen t ) 
Gross domest ic product 7.2 6.7 7.4 7.6 7.4 1.9 5.2 6 . 0 6 . 5 6 . 6 1 • '6.6 
Expo r t s o f goo'ds and s e r v i c e s 0 . 6 3.4 8.3 11.7 2.9 -1.9 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.0 2.1 
Imports o f gpoc's and s e r v i c e s 10.8 4.8 8.4 14.8 19.6 -7.-6 -4.1 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.6 
P r i c e i ndexes : 1970=100 -
Expo r t s o f goods and se rv i ce s - 100 .0 ' 99.5 1 0 9 . 2 I36.O 175.4 175.-6 1G6.8 200.2 21C.7 236.4 254.3 
Imports of goads and servioes. . 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 5 . 7 111.2 122.3 :l-75.5 1 9 2 . 9 200.5 2 1 6 . 7 233.0 249,1 2 6 5 . 4 
Terras o f t r a d e , goods and 
94,1 94.9 95.8 s e r v i c e s 100.0 9Ö.2 111.9 1 0 0 , 0 91.0 93.2 92 .4 93.9 
Ç o e f f i c i e n t v i t h r e spec t t o e: p o r t s 'of g oods and s e r v i o e s ( p e r c en t ) 
N e t ex t e rna l f a c t o r payments i4,4 15.0 14,8 I3.2 . .12,5 15,3 19.8 21,4 22.2 22 .9 23,2. 
S e r v i c t a q o f the er r temal debt 24.7 2 7 . 6 29.7 ' 30.6 ! 2C.2 « •• 32.2 36^0 38 .2 39.7 40.2 
M i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s a t c u r r e n t p r i c e s 
E x p o r t s o f goods and s e r v i c e s 12 094 12 444 14 785 20 674 . 27 2G9 26 796 30 701 35 467 4l 798 48 786 56 693 
Imports of goods and s e r v i c e s 12 092 14 2 77 16 286 21 557 35 265 35 G24 35 683 4o 322 45 449 50 798 56 602 
Trade gap 798 ' 1 C33 1 SOI GG3 7 976 9 028 4 982 4 855 3 651 2 012 -91 
N e t e x t e rna l f a c t o r payments 1 73Ó " 1 867 2 IG9 2 735 3 4o8. 4 890 6 0 79 • 7 5Gl 9 29O 1 1 152 13 144. 
N e t ex te rna l f i n a n c i n g 2 534 3 700 3 690 3 6 1 3 . - 11. 324 . . 13.918 • . 1 1 061 1 2 436 12 949 13 164 13 053 
A m o r t i z a t i o n of the ex t e rna l 
3 r ? p i 
•- - - ' •• v . 
1 2 1 8 3 14 428 debt 2 000 2 193 2 Goo ., * 6 051 7 919 1 0 005 
S e r v i c i n g of the ex te rna l 
438 7/696' 9 O80 1 2 761 rl5. 984 835 deb t 2 98G ' 3 4 397 6'332 . . . 19 353 22 
D i r e c t f o r e i g n investment . 724 687 815 1 419 l;644 ... • • • • • • • t • 
N e t er.ternol l o a n s 3 842 4 555 7 347 9 062 ,11 456 * * • • • • • • « • I * • • • 
N e t compensatory uovements, 
672 
7.;- . -p.: 
e r r o r s and o m i s s i o n s , e t c . - 32 651 - 1 - 2 922 2 1 8 6 . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • « 
F o r e i g n c a p i t a l requi rements 4 534 5 893 6 490 7 579 1 5 286 ... 17 112 20 355 22 954 25 347 27 48i 
E x t e r n a l deb t ... ... 31 o4j 4l 010 52 839 . . . . 65 I 8 2 80 207 96 077 112 388 129 0 1 2 
Sources CEPAL. 
a / A r g e n t i n a , B r a s i l , Civi le , . C o l o m b i a , Co s t a R i c a , E l S a l v a d o r , Guatemala , Honduras , M e x i c o , N i c a r a g u a and Panama. 
Tab le I I I - 2 
LATIN AMERICA, NON -OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES ( l l COUNTRIES)s/s GROVJTH, TRADS GAP AND EXTERNAL FINANCING, I 9 7 O - I 9 8 O -
SCENARIO B 
W O 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1 9 7 8 1979 1 9 8 0 
1 • Annual growth r a t e s ( p e r cent ) .. * 
Gross domestlo product . . . 7.2 6 . 7 . 7.4 7.6 7.4 1.9 5,1 . . 4.9 6,1. .. . 6 , 4 . 6.5 
Exports of goods and se rv i ces 0,6 3.4 , , , 8.3 11.7 2.9 ,•¡•1.9 7.7 7.8 7.9 . . 8 . 0 8 . 1 
Imports of goods and s e rv i oe s 1 0 . 8 . 4.8 8.4 14.8 19.6 -7.6 r - 4 . 3 3.4 ' ;4.5. 4 . 5 4.5 
- Indexes of un i t value? 1 9 7 0 = 100 
Exports of goods and se rv ioea 1 0 0 . 0 99.5 1 0 9 . 2 I 3 6 . 8 175.4 175.6 ; "186.8 2 0 0 . 2 ' 218.7*; 23 .̂4 254.3 
Imparts of goods and se rv ioea loo.o 1Q5.7 ; 111.2 122.3 175.5 1 9 2 . 9 200.5 : 216,7 2 3 3 . 0 249.1 2 6 5 . 4 
Terms of t r a d e , goods and se rv ioes 1 0 0 . 0 94.1 9 8 . 2 111.9 1 0 0 . 0 9 1 . 0 93.2 9 2 . 4 93.9 9 4 . 9 95.8 
C . e f f i o l e n t s w i th r e speo t to ' expor t s of goods and s e r v i c e s ( pe r cent ) 
Net f a o t o r payments - 14.4 I5.O 14.8 13.2 12.5 15.3 1 9 . 8 21.4 22.1 -22.6 22.8 
Serv ic ing of the ex t e rna l debt 27.6 29.7 3 0 . 6 ' 28,2 O » e 3 2 . 2 3 6 . O 3 8 . 0 39.1 39.5 
M i l l i o n s .of d o l l a r s a t current p r i c e s 
Exports of goods and s e rv i c e s 1 2 054 12 444 14 7 8 5 20 674 27289 2 6 796 30 701 35 467 4l 7 9 8 I48 7 8 6 56 693 
Imports of goods and se rv ioes 1 2 8 9 2 14 277 1 6 2 8 6 21 557 35 265 35 824 35 64l 39 802 44 7 3 2 49 994 55 047 
Trade gap 798 1 833 1 5 0 1 8 8 3 7 976 . ; 9 0 2 8 1+ 940 4'335 2 934 . 1 208 -1 046 
Net ex te rna l f a o t o r payments 1 736 1 867 2 189 2 735 3 U 0 8 4 8 9 0 6 0 8 0 7-577 9 252 11 «40 12 952 
Net e x t e r n a l f i nano ing 2 534 3 7 0 9 3 6 9 0 '3 618 11 384 1 3 9 1 8 11 020 1 1 - 9 1 2 12 186 12 248 • 11 9 O 6 
Amortization of the e x t e r n a l debt 2 0 0 0 2 1 9 3 .2.800 3 961 3 902 ... 6 0 5 0 7 915 9 934 12 015 14 144 
Se rv i o i r ^ of the e x t e r n a l debt 2 988 3 . 4 3 8 4 397 6 3 3 î 7 6 9 6 .... 9 881 1 2 7 5 4 15 877 19 O97 . 2 2 4 o o 
Direot f « r e i g n investment 724 6 8 7 8 1 5 1 419 1 044 ... ... • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Net e x t e rna l loans 3 842 4 555 7 347 9 0 8 2 , , 1 1 4 5 6 .... • >• , • • • • • • • 9» • • • 
Net compensatory movements, e r r o r s -
and omissions, e t o . -32 6 5 1 - 1 ' 6 7 2 "2 922 • 2 m • • * ... • • • • • • • • • 
Fore ign o a p i t a l requirements 4 534 5 8 9 3 6 490 7 579 «5 -t86 ... 17 070 19 8 2 7 22 120 24 2 6 3 2 6 0 5 0 
Externa l debt • • • ... ' 3 1 045 41 0& 52 8 3 9 ... 65 229 79 731 94 9I9 110 1418 1 2 5 9 9 2 
S O U T H » » CEPAL . 
&/ Argent ina , B r a z i l , C h i l e , Colombia, Costa R ioa , E l Sa lvador , Guatemala, Honduras, Maxioo , N loaragua and Panama» 
/ . . ' 






C E P A L 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
E/CEPA L/L.131 




LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT: ITS APPRAISAL AND 
LONG-TERM PROSPECTS 
Preliminary Summary Kutline 
76-3-46? 
,.. . i.. •.!•;•.• 
i;." / S ¡: '-t 
- 1 -
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the secretariat has carried out two biennial 
appraisals of Latin American development in connexion with the 
application and implementation of the International Development 
Strategy (IDS) at the regional level.. .These studies led to the 
Quito and Chaguaramas. Appraisals, which represented a valuable 
contribution to the work of the Unit.ed Nations and were of particular 
importance in shaping a Latin American position .covering matters .: 
with political connotations,, in respect of which it is not. easy • 
to reach agreement. . .. . , 
However, when these and other similar studies are considered 
in the light of the irreluct.able responsibilities of ECLA, the 
evoluti on of the ideas, which the secretariat has been formu3.ating for 
some time, the transformations and changes which have been taking 
place in Latin America, . and .those now developing at the international 
level, the feeling grows that the time is ripe and there is now a. 
need for the secretariat to devote its efforts to more ambitious • 
studies of greater .organic importance. Such studies should be aimed 
at ''rethinking11 the realities of the economic and social process in 
Latin America; highlighting both its common features and.the special 
characteristics shown by the broad panorama of the countries of the. 
region; studying the prospects and options offered for the development 
of our countries in the long term and within the framework of the 
new international conditions which the future holds out, and 
contributing ideas or suggesting strategies and policies which put 
the institutional and structural changes that need to be promoted 
in a clearer light. 
These objectives have led the secretariat to propose a project 
which could be drawn up around three central themes, namely: 
(a) The appraisal of the economic and social process during 
the postwar period; 





(c) The study of the long-term-ecbnomic growth prospects at the 
national, regional and international levels, on the basis 
of various development scenarios. 
The very nature of the preoccupations which underlie the 
project reveals two of its methodological aspects;, On the one hand, 
it will be- concerned with the long term, since the factors influencing 
the matters of greatest interest only undergo significant change 
over long periods. On. the other, it :must cover social, economic and 
political aspects, so . that it will have to" adbjpt an integrated approach. 
In addition to covering matters of long-standing concern to ECLA, 
the project offers the opportunity of making progress in directions 
which fully coincide with the recommendations of the General Assembly. 
Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 3362 (S-VII) 
on Development and International Economic Co-operation, 3^09 (XXX) on 
the Unified Approach to Development Analysis and Planning, and 
350C (XXX) on the Examination of Long-Term Trends in the Economic 
Development of the Regions of the World. In these resolutions stress 
is placed on the tasks which the secretariats of the regional 
commissions should discharge in the integrated analysis of long-term 
development, and they reaffirm the responsibilities incumbent on 




PRELIMINARY SUf^RYrOUTLINE . 
. LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT ITS'"' APPtlAI SAÎ, '*r 
AND LONG-TERM ¡PROSPECTS1 ' ' 
" ,.. , PART i ... . 
Appraisal of the economic.and social process 
over the period 1950-1975 
I * Development and socia l change. , . 
A. Social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n » I t s evolution since 1950. Emergence 
of new st rata . 
B. Urbanization. Magnitude of the phenomenon. Cultural and 
consumption patterns. . . . . . . . . 
C. The ru ra l s i tuat ion . Systems of explo i tat ion. Agrarian 
reforms. Migration from, rural, areas to the c i t i e s . 
P o l i t i c a l and socia l part ic ipat ion. 
D. D is t r ibut ion of income and of soc ia l services. C r i t i c a l 
poverty. Evolution of educational systems. 
E. Population growth. Geographical red is t r ibut io j i . Evolution 
of trends. 
F. Challenges to ex ist ing national soc iet ies . Tendencies 
towards social development. Emergence of an al ternat ive 
model. 
I I . Growth and economic change 
A. Fundamental changes during the, period 1950-19,75« 
B. The dynamics of the process.. . Domestic and external factors . 
C. State par t ic ipat ion . The role of public enterprises. 
D. Foreign trade, external financing and transnational 
corporations. .. i 
E. Income d is t r ibu t ion and c r i t i c a l poverty. 
F. Spatial d i s t r ibut ion of economic a c t i v i t y . Appraisal of the 
heterogeneity of countries or groups of countries. 
/ I l l . Internat ional 
- if -
I I I . International economic delations 
A. Lat in America in the context of the changes which occurred 
i n the world economy between 19^0 and 1975« The main 
changes which have taken place i n the structure of Lat in 
America's foreign trade and external f inancing. 
B. Internat ional trade. Economic development and the balance 
of payments. Basic commodities. The trade i n manufactures 
and semi-manufactures« The relat ionship between imports 
and stages of the development process. 
C. External f inancing. The elements determining i t s composition 
and magnitude. Evolution of external indebtedness. 
D. Lat in America's economic re lat ions with other areas. The 
indust r ia l i zed market economy countries and the soc ia l i s t 
countries. 
E. Co-operation between the developing countries. 
I V . The economic integrat ion of Latin America 
A. The establishment of the regional and sub-regional integration 
schemes. The i n i t i a l impulse. The present c r i s i s . 
: B. Integrat ion and national development. Stages i n the 
integration, processes and i n the economic growth models 
of the countries. 
C. Appraisal of trade i n the various integrat ion schemes. 
Lat in American trade outside the integrat ion schemes. 
Relations between the schemes. 
V» Sector ial changes 
A. Agr i cu l tu ra l development. 
1. The agr i cu l tu ra l sector in the context of the. national 
economies. Relationship with the external sector. : 
2. The agrarian economy. Basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l aspects. 
3» The dynamics of agr icu l tu ra l production. Changes and 
heterogeneity. Domestic-and external demand. 
Agr iculture and the problem of n u t r i t i o n . 
/B. Indust r ia l 
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B. Indust r ia l development 
1. Evolution of the indust r ia l sector. Pr inc ipal 
character is t ics . Appraisal at the world l e v e l . 
I t s ro le i n the development of the countries of 
the region. 
2. Factors i n indus t r ia l development. Indus t r ia l 
development scenarios and patterns. 
3» The role of government i n indust r ia l i zat ion« 
C. Energy ' " '"." V.'. ...'."' 
1. The energy sector in the context of the, national 
economies. ' 
2. Appraisal of energy supply and demand i n the period 
1950-1975. 
, 3« The Lat in American energy éituation in - the world 
c o n t e x t . . . '... ; 
Do Mining 
1. The re lat ive importance of the sector at the regional 
and national l e v e l . -
2. Evolution of demand and production i n the period 1950-1975« 
3« The Lat in American mining sector i n the world context. 
E. Transport ;and communications 
1. Sëa transport . National merchant f l ee ts . Multinational 
endeavours. Foreign f lee ts . New technologies. 
2. Land transport . 
3. Communications. 
/PART I I 
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PART II 
The prospects for Latin American development : Evolution 
and change in the next 25 years 
VI» Basic resources» Availability and the requirements of 
economic growth 
A. The population and human resources. Demographic prospects 
and the labour force, , . 
B. Agricultural resources. Expansion of the agricultural 
frontier and changes in productivity. 
C. Mineral and energy resources. Reserves, and the technical 
and economic factors affecting their exploitation. 
D. The capacity of accumulation. 
VII. Definition and analysis of various Latin American development 
scenarios. Quantitative analysis schemes 
A. Scenario based on the projection of the prevailing general 
trends and features of the Latin American economic and social 
process. Analysis of the degree of stability, contradictions 
and problems likely to arise from these trends and lines of 
development. 
1. Economic growth: the significance that the projection 
of past trends and of the targets of the IDS would have 
at the national, regional and international levels. 
Evolution at the end of the present.decade and,in the 
longer term. Effects on employment,, income distribution, 
and the solution of the problem of critical poverty. 
2. Capital formation. National saving and external 
financing. 
3» Social evolution. Urbanization, education, life styles, 
social stratification. Outside influences. 
k* International economic relations. Foreign trade and 
external financing. Evolution of dependency on 
industrialized countries. The role of transnational 
corporations. The process of regional integration. 
/5. Sectorial 
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5« Sectorial evolution*^Production, productivity and 
employment. Agriculture, nutrition and foreign trade. 
Industrial production and patterns of industrialization. 
Energy. Mining. • • 
6. Heterogeneity and similarity of national development at 
: t h e , regional level.-. Changes .in the relative positions 
of countries. , ; :.•:•••• 
B. Scenario based on the assumption of increasing regional 
integration changes in the international economic order and 
acceleration of/the rate, of growth. : Social orientation of 
development. . 
1. Economic growth: acceleration of growth and less unequal 
tendencies i*i the distribution of production and income 
at the world and regional levels. Increase in employment. 
Changes in income distribution and special attention to 
the problem of critical poverty. Changes in structure 
of domestic demand. 
2. Capital formation: volume and sectorial allocation. 
Increase in national saving and share of external 
financing. 
3. Social evolution. Greater social and political 
participation. Changes in social stratification in 
keeping with economic and social changes. Educational 
policy. 
International economic relations. Lower rate of growth 
of the industrialized market economy countries. New 
structure of external trade relations. Changes in degree 
of dependence on industrialized countries. Trade flows 
and their composition. Terms of trade. External 
financing. Increase in trade between the developing 
countries. 
5. Regional integration. Increase in regional and trade and 
changes in its composition. Relations between the 
integration schemes. Financial co-operation. Sectorial 
economic effects of integration, at the national level. 
Relative evolution of the integration schemes. 
/5. Sectorial 
- o -
Sectorial evolution .arid change.: ProductA'ony "productivity 
and employment. ., - '<•.• 
Agricultural production: production requirements and 
availability of basic resources. External trade. 
Industrial production: increase in rate of growth; 
trade between the countries of the region and with other 
areas; social needs, structure of demand, and patterns 
of industrialization. 
Energy: domestic .demand,- production and primary sources; 
structural changes; external supplies and regional 
balance. 
Mining: domestic demand, prioduction. and; foreign trade. 
